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Is innocence still irrelevant? In his influential 1970 article,
Judge Henry Friendly provocatively asked why innocence is ir-
relevant to federal habeas corpus review.i Judge Friendly pro-
posed that innocence should provide a ground for relief from a
criminal conviction, but his call went unheeded, perhaps be-
cause at that time innocence could rarely be proven with any
certainty. For reasons of reliability, courts distrusted exculpa-
tory witnesses who came forward years after a trial, when their
memories had faded and their motives were suspect. In addi-
tion, forensic evidence was usually not very probative. Claims
asserting the existence of new evidence of innocence were con-
sidered fundamentally equivocal, and, as a result, states im-
posed strict rules of finality, barring claims brought after limi-
tation periods expired. Thus, in the decades since Judge
Friendly first asked whether innocence should be relevant to
criminal appeals, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to
1. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 159-60 (1970).
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recognize a constitutional claim of innocence. Most prominent-
ly, in 1993, in Herrera v. Collins, the Court narrowly failed to
recognize a constitutional innocence claim in the context of cap-
ital cases, emphasizing the dual concerns of finality and relia-
bility.2
The advent of DNA testing technology inaugurated an era
in which innocence can be proven with far greater certainty
long after a crime has occurred. In the process, DNA has un-
dermined the concerns of finality and reliability that supported
the result in Herrera. No longer is a witness's recollection or
even a confession the most reliable evidence of guilt. Instead,
physical evidence has taken on central importance in claims of
innocence: a cigarette butt, a half-eaten cinnamon bun, a
sweat-soaked bandana, or a cotton swab-pieces of stray evi-
dence that would play at most a tangential role two decades
ago-can now demonstrate guilt or innocence decades after a
crime with no decrease in accuracy. Since 1989, 216 prisoners
have been exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing, and
thousands of others have been exonerated before trial.3
Despite this shift, the Court has failed to recognize a con-
stitutional claim of innocence, and even the most straightfor-
ward claims of innocence continue to face substantial ob-
stacles.4 An illustrative case is that of Frank Lee Smith, a man
who spent fourteen years in prison in Florida after a jury con-
2. 506 U.S. 390, 401, 403-04 (1993); see infra Part III.
3. See The Innocence Project, Home Page, http://www.innocenceproject
.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). Throughout this Article, by an exoneration, I
mean a legal determination that the conviction should be vacated, either by a
court or an executive pardon, based in part on new evidence of innocence,
which was not followed by a new trial.
4. The Court had an opportunity in the 2005 Term to reconsider Herrera
in a case involving post-conviction DNA testing. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct.
2064, 2078 (2006); infra Part I.A. An empirical study that I conducted examin-
ing the criminal appeals brought by the first two hundred people exonerated
by post-conviction DNA testing presented data regarding how those exonerees
often faced difficulties obtaining the DNA testing that ultimately exonerated
them and described how few prevailed on claims of innocence. See generally
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008). All
who raised innocence claims before obtaining DNA testing were denied relief.
Id. at 111. In seeking DNA evidence, approximately half of the two hundred
were refused access to DNA testing by law enforcement, often necessitating a
court order. Id. at 120. Twenty percent required a pardon because, even after
being excluded by DNA test results, they lacked any judicial forum for relief;
at least twelve were denied relief by courts even after DNA test results exclu-
ded them. Id.
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victed him and sentenced him to death in 1986 for a rape-
murder that he did not commit.5 In 1998, Smith's lawyers ob-
tained a stay of execution and began seeking DNA testing to
bolster their case for his innocence, which rested on the recan-
tation of the State's star eyewitness. 6 The district attorney suc-
cessfully opposed motions seeking DNA testing for years; state
laws provided no post-conviction right of access to such evi-
dence.7 It was not until DNA tests implicated another man in a
series of rapes and murders in the area that law enforcement
consented to testing. DNA testing ultimately inculpated that
man and excluded Smith, but only in December 2000, after
Smith had already died of cancer on Florida's death row.8 Part-
ly in reaction to Smith v. State,9 Florida passed a statute in
2001 entitling a petitioner to obtain DNA testing and, if the re-
sults are exculpatory, the right to relief.10 Like most states that
have enacted new innocence claims in recent years, however,
Florida included several restrictions limiting access to testing,
such as a requirement that a petitioner satisfy a preliminary
showing of innocence to receive DNA testing, and until the sta-
tute was amended in 2006, time limits on obtaining testing and
denial of testing to those who had pleaded guilty." Our system
remains at a crossroads, not yet fully adopting an approach
that directly assesses the probative impact of evidence of inno-
cence, but failing to discard many of the traditional limitations
on innocence claims.
In this Article, I argue that our criminal system should en-
sure full access to evidence of innocence at trial, and that dur-
ing appeals and post-conviction proceedings our criminal sys-
tem should review claims of innocence based only on the
probative power of the new evidence of innocence, freed from
5. See Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. 1987) (affirming a convic-
tion of first-degree murder and a sentence of death); Frontline, Requiem for
Frank Lee Smith, http://www.pbs.org/wgbhpages/frontline/shows/smitheight
(last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
6. Smith, 515 So. 2d at 185.
7. See Frontline, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Smith, 515 So. 2d 182.
10. See, e.g., Alisa Ulferts, Bill Allows Inmates to Request DNA Tests, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 9, 2001, at 1B, available at 2001 WLNR
11083434.
11. See FLA. STAT. § 925.11(2)(f)(3) (2007); id. historical and statutory
notes.
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traditional restrictions that have hindered even meritorious
claims. By a claim of innocence, I mean a legal contention seek-
ing relief from a criminal conviction based chiefly on evidence
that the convict did not commit the criminal acts. I divide inno-
cence claims into three basic categories: (1) substantial claims;
(2) outcome-determinative claims; and (3) inconclusive claims.
These categories reflect a spectrum based on the varying de-
grees to which the new evidence of innocence-evidence not
available at the time of trial-may undermine the evidence
that was introduced at the criminal trial. In cases involving
substantial showings of innocence, new evidence overwhelm-
ingly shows that the convict was not the perpetrator of a crime.
A second category, termed outcome-determinative, includes
cases in which the new evidence of innocence does not substan-
tially undercut an element of a crime, conviction, or sentence,
but makes it more likely than not that a new jury would fail to
convict. The Supreme Court employed such "holistic" analysis
regarding the outcome in House v. Bell,12 its first decision to
confront DNA evidence of innocence. Finally, the category of in-
conclusive claims encompasses cases in which DNA technology,
although providing information regarding a genetic profile, has
limited probative value, such as where biological evidence does
not show identity or identity is not disputed. 13
Courts typically evaluate claims of innocence based on ex-
trinsic considerations, including the trial attorney's diligence,
the crime of conviction, the amount of time that has passed
since conviction, whether the petitioner pleaded guilty, and
whether a purely hypothetical scenario could explain the DNA
exclusion. 14 Such standards may result in courts denying relief
to petitioners who raise meritorious claims of innocence. Under
the standard of review that I propose, claims of innocence
would be assessed based upon the degree to which new evi-
dence of innocence undercuts the evidence of guilt presented at
trial. After delineating an approach that simply evaluates the
probative impact of new evidence of innocence, I show that our
12. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006) (explaining how the appro-
priate inquiry for the Court is a "holistic judgment" on how a reasonable jury
would apply the reasonable doubt standard in light of new evidence supple-
menting the record).
13. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 700 N.W.2d 98, 127 (Wis. 2005); infra
note 396 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.C.
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criminal justice system still fails to uniformly take such an ap-
proach, despite the enactment of new statutes permitting post-
conviction innocence claims. While rules governing how inno-
cence can be asserted differ at each stage of a criminal case, at
no stage is evidence consistently assessed based on its proba-
tive value.
With DNA testing in wide use, evidence of innocence has
never been more relevant to criminal investigations and trials.
Even so, criminal procedure rules still fail to ensure full and
accurate access to physical and forensic evidence probative of
innocence. Many commentators and legislators have assumed
that DNA exonerations would fade away. 15 However, I present
new longitudinal empirical analysis of DNA exonerations to
show why treatment of DNA during investigations and trials
may cause such exonerations to continue for far longer than
previously thought. Strikingly, more than one-quarter of post-
conviction DNA exonerees were tried and convicted in the DNA
era (since 1990).16 The exonerees did not obtain DNA testing
during the trial stage because of, among other reasons, errors
or misconduct by forensic experts, ineffective lawyering, and
the inadequacies of then-existing DNA technology. Criminal
procedure rules, however, do not ensure access to independent
forensic experts, preservation of biological evidence, or discov-
ery regarding state forensic analysis. Although DNA testing is
conducted more frequently than ever before, the failure of crim-
inal procedure rules to address these problems means that
claims of innocence may persist for some time, albeit with a dif-
ferent focus: the proper handling and disclosure of biological
material and DNA test results.
Meanwhile, state criminal appeals and post-conviction re-
view, though reshaped by nearly nationwide legislative change,
15. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 250 (2000) ("In a few
years, the era of DNA exonerations will come to an end."); James S. Liebman,
The New Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to Do with It?, 33 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 547-48 (2002) (describing how "the backlog of existing
post-trial cases in which there is DNA evidence to test will not be replenished"
but also reasons why exonerations may recur); Michael J. Saks et al., Toward
a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convictions, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 669, 669 (2001) ("The window will soon close .... ); infra note
247 (noting state statutes that include sunset provisions for post-conviction
DNA testing based on an assumption that such testing will prove unnecessary
after a short period of time).
16. Garrett, supra note 4, at 130.
[92:16291634
CLAIMING INNOCENCE
typically lack an avenue for courts to simply assess the proba-
tive value of new evidence of innocence. The Supreme Court's
failure to recognize a constitutional innocence claim has
created substantial pressure on the states that have faced first-
hand embarrassment from more than two hundred post-
conviction DNA exonerations. In response, within the space of a
decade, forty-five jurisdictions enacted statutes providing
rights to post-conviction DNA testing and a vacatur if DNA
testing, or occasionally other evidence, demonstrates innocence.
In this Article, I survey those statutes and evaluate judicial
rulings interpreting them. These statutes represent a remark-
able change in the law, upending rules of finality and creating
the first system of review focused exclusively upon claims of in-
nocence.
Despite these innovations, post-conviction DNA statutes
also routinely impose severe limitations on access to DNA test-
ing and relief. Almost all statutes require a preliminary show-
ing of innocence in order to obtain DNA testing itself, and they
often bar access to petitioners who pleaded guilty and those
whose attorney failed to request DNA testing at trial. More-
over, they impose other substantive and procedural hurdles.
Compounding the problem, courts still deny access to potential-
ly exonerating evidence such as DNA testing, typically because
of stilted interpretations of the newly enacted statutes or stark
misapprehension of the potential probative power of DNA tests.
Courts continue to deny relief even to some individuals who ac-
tually demonstrate their innocence through testing.
Incomplete recognition of claims of innocence in the states
occurred in the shadow of the Supreme Court's reluctance to
recognize a constitutional claim of innocence. In 1993, the same
year that modern DNA testing began to reshape our criminal
system, the Court had an opportunity to decide whether an in-
nocence claim exists under the U.S. Constitution. In Herrera,
the Court evaded the question, stating hypothetically that a
prisoner might have a right not to be executed given an "ex-
traordinary" showing of innocence; no subsequent case has
been held to satisfy this standard. 17 In 1995, the Court again
17. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); infra Part III.A. Anthony
Amsterdam calls this a "state of denial," explaining that "[t]he fixation of
courts on the issue of guilt or innocence almost always takes the form of deny-
ing claims of error because the judges believe that a convicted defendant is
guilty, not of willingness to provide forums for the vindication of convicted
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addressed innocence, ruling in Schlup v. Delo that no constitu-
tional claim of innocence exists.'8 It did say, however, that in-
nocence may excuse the procedural default of some other con-
stitutional claim. 19 In its 2005 Term, the Court reiterated these
holdings in its first post-conviction DNA case, House v. Bell.
The Court ruled that a showing of innocence so strong that a
new jury "more likely than not" would not convict did not result
in freedom for the convicted, but only that the court could reach
the merits of a defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.20
Although the Supreme Court in Herrera and House did not
recognize a constitutional innocence claim, evidence of inno-
cence has already impacted constitutional criminal procedure
in three largely unnoticed ways. First, lower federal courts
grant DNA testing to obtain new evidence of innocence during
discovery or pursuant to § 1983 actions. 21 Second, several fed-
eral courts have held that new evidence of innocence can but-
tress constitutional claims by illuminating State misconduct or
by supporting claims regarding the State's use of tainted, inac-
curate evidence. Third, new evidence of innocence supports re-
lief where, absent such evidence, a court might otherwise find
error harmless, including by relying on the perceived reliability
of the State's evidence of guilt. Unfortunately, while these ap-
proaches begin to close the gaps at the state and federal levels,
they do not provide a uniform standard for claiming innocence.
Adopting a uniform freestanding innocence claim that en-
titles a court to review the probative impact of new evidence of
innocence would require changing existing constitutional crim-
inal procedure. DNA technology has eroded the twin pillars
supporting the Court's ruling in Herrera: reliability and finali-
ty. Hence, the Court could reconsider establishing a due
process right to relief from a conviction or sentence on the
ground of innocence. The Court's "more likely than not" stan-
persons who present colorable claims of innocence." Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Verbatim: Lady Justice's Blindfold Has Been Shredded, CHAMPION, May 2007,
at 51, 51.
18. See 513 U.S. 298, 313-17 (1995).
19. See id. at 326-27.
20. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086-87 (2006).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). For a discussion of such a case, see infra
notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
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dard in Schlup already provides a logical standard of review for
such a claim. 22
Until a claim of innocence is established by the Court or by
farther-reaching legislation, the clearly innocent will not al-
ways readily receive access to proof or relief. Granting relief for
unusual claims of innocence in a narrow band of cases should
not overly tax the system, so long as a framework is adopted to
identify those claims; as the Court has acknowledged, "such de-
cisions are rare."23 This is especially true since DNA technology
has already transformed the way that actors handle certain se-
rious criminal cases at every stage in the criminal system.
Nevertheless, our courts might not adopt an innocence
claim resembling the one I advocate any time soon, nor may
they properly apply an optimal standard should one be enacted.
After all, under existing state statutes, courts have denied in-
nocent people relief even after DNA testing excluded them.
Thus, I describe means outside the existing post-conviction sys-
tem for granting relief on the basis of innocence, such as inno-
cence commissions or other independent bodies tasked with the
review of innocence claims. Whatever the mechanism, as a
growing constellation of rights and remedies gradually shifts
the focus of our system from solely remedying violations of pro-
cedural rights to creating new avenues for redressing substan-
tive claims of innocence, the emphasis should be placed on
what makes DNA technology so transformative: the probative
impact of new evidence of innocence. Furthermore, our criminal
system can avoid the need to later judge innocence if protec-
tions better ensure access to evidence of innocence at the time
of trial.
This Article begins in Part I by examining the case of
House v. Bell, in which the Supreme Court confronted the defi-
nition of innocence in its first post-conviction DNA case, and
then framing how innocence can be assessed based on the
probative impact of new exculpatory evidence. Part II then
shows how our system fails to strictly assess innocence in that
manner at any stage. Our system does not ensure access to
DNA evidence of innocence at trial, which results in wrongful
convictions. Although states have adopted post-conviction DNA
statutes, almost all states exclude entire categories of convicts
22. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329.
23. Id. at 322 n.36.
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and impose substantial hurdles unrelated to whether testing
could prove innocence. Meanwhile, federal courts lack any ac-
tual innocence claim, though they adopt several approaches
that begin to move in that direction. Finally, Part III concludes
by arguing that the Constitution supports the adoption of a
freestanding innocence claim that would grant relief to those
who can show that, more likely than not, no reasonable jury
would convict in light of the new evidence.
I. DEFINING INNOCENCE
Which prisoner's habeas petition poses the easiest question
for a federal court to decide: (a) the prisoner whose trial lawyer
was ineffective and presented a poor defense case; (b) the pris-
oner who alleges that police officers concealed evidence that
would have undermined the prosecutor's case; or (c) the prison-
er who offers new DNA evidence of his innocence? The common
sense lay-person's answer might be (c): scientific evidence of
innocence should most readily lead to the release of a convict.
The hard-nosed post-conviction attorney would counter
that, in any federal court, the prisoner in (c) would have little
to no chance of success because proving "actual innocence" does
not entitle a prisoner to constitutional relief. On the other
hand, the claims of (a) and (b) both involve established consti-
tutional criminal procedure rights and thus would have a bet-
ter chance for success. Indeed, the prisoner in (c) might only
have a shot at success if his petition involved both DNA evi-
dence of innocence and the sort of run-of-the-mill procedural
claim brought by prisoners (a) and (b). This is true because, as I
describe below, the Court ruled in Herrera and then reaffirmed
in House that prisoners lack any substantive right to be freed
because they are innocent.
A. THE CASE OF HOUSE V. BELL
In House, the Supreme Court for the first time acknowl-
edged the central role that DNA technology can play in crimi-
nal cases. The Court ruled that Paul House, a death row pris-
oner in Tennessee, had presented evidence, including post-
conviction DNA testing, showing a reasonable probability of his
innocence. 24 The DNA testing showed that semen obtained
24. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2074.
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from the victim's clothes did not match Paul House.25 Yet de-
spite this evidence, rotating combinations of federal judges at
different times ruled that (1) House was actually innocent and
deserved a new trial; (2) House was guilty and should be ex-
ecuted; and (3) House showed a reasonable probability of his
innocence such that his defaulted ineffective assistance of
counsel claim should be considered on remand.26 The House
case exemplifies how almost two decades into the DNA era,
courts remain uncertain about how to approach new evidence of
actual innocence, even evidence as powerful as DNA test re-
sults.
House's case begins, like many in which DNA evidence has
been relevant, with a gruesome crime. Carolyn Muncey was
found murdered in the woods near her East Tennessee home in
the summer of 1985.27 The police quickly focused on two sus-
pects: her husband, Hubert, who had grown up in the area and
had a history of serious domestic abuse, and Paul House, a con-
victed sex offender who had recently moved to the area. 28 When
someone claimed to have seen House emerge, the day after the
murder, from the woods near where Mrs. Muncey's body was
found, the police investigated House.29 He stated he had been
at his girlfriend's house that night.30 She reported that he left
her home the night of the murder and returned without his
shirt and shoes but with a bruise and scratches. 31 He claimed
to have been scratched by his girlfriend's cats and to have
bruised his fingers at his construction job.32
The State's theory at trial was that House raped and mur-
dered Mrs. Muncey. The testimony of the witness who saw him
emerge from the woods and of House's girlfriend provided cir-
cumstantial evidence connecting him to the crime. Direct evi-
dence of House's connection rested upon serology evidence de-
rived from semen on the victim's clothes, blood on her
nightgown, and from bloodstains on House's jeans. 33
25. Id. at 2078-79.
26. Id. at 2075-76.
27. Id. at 2070.
28. Id. at 2071.
29. Id. at 2070-71.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2072-73.
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At trial, FBI Special Agent Paul Bigbee presented the fo-
rensic evidence from the victim's clothes at trial in a manner
that improperly exaggerated its probative power.34 The semen
evidence consisted of ABO serology evidence,3 5 as DNA testing
would not be in use for several more years. The A blood group
substances found on the victim's nightgown were consistent
with House's A blood type, but also with the victim's blood type.
Semen stains on the victim's panties did not exhibit A blood
group substances; instead, where only the H substance was de-
tected, those stains were consistent with having originated
from an 0 type secretor. Nonetheless, the FBI Agent told the
jury that both sets of stains could have come from House. As
the Innocence Project later pointed out in their amicus brief,
this testimony was improper science. 36 Special Agent Bigbee at-
tempted to resolve the inconsistency as follows:
Q: Can you tell us whether or not the A substance could have been
there, prior to you doing the testing?
A: It could have, yes.
Q: Does the age of the stain make a difference as to whether you find
both of these substances?
A: The age of the stain does to some extent make a difference. The
environment in which the stain remained after it was deposited could
also make a difference. The H blood group substance is the precursor
to the B and A blood group substances, chemically, and it can also be
degraded from the A or the B to the H.
Q: Which means that the H lasts longer, so to speak?
A: In certain cases, yes.
34. See Brief of the Innocence Project, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Petitioner at 24, House, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (No. 04-8990), 2005 WL 779581,
at *18 [hereinafter Innocence Project Brief] (describing "that the FBI serolo-
gist who analyzed the stains on the victim's underwear and nightgown, and
compared them to the defendant's own blood type, appears to have wholly mis-
represented the results of the original tests to the jury on both items").
35. Serology refers to a range of laboratory tests that utilize serum and
antigen reactions to antibodies to examine, among other things, ABO blood-
type groups. JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING 39 (2d ed. 2005). The
ABO blood group substances are found on red blood cells, and for about eighty
percent of the population, called "secretors," those substances are expressed in
other body fluids, including saliva, semen and vaginal fluid. ABO typing tests
fluids for the presence of the A, B, and H blood group substances. See House,
126 S. Ct. at 2072.
36. See Innocence Project Brief, supra note 34, at 25-26, 2005 WL 779581,
at *19.
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Q: So, A could deteriorate into H?
A: Yes.37
While biological material may degrade, the prosecution's
witness made up the notion that only certain antigens would
"selectively degrade" ("the conveniently 'Vanishing A"')-not
only was there no evidence to support the conjecture, but amici
pointed out that this concept is "simply unheard of in the field
of serology."38 If "antigens could selectively 'vanish,"' and blood
types could mutate from one to another, "then serology would
never have been a reliable method."39 Hence, Special Agent
Bigbee was either grossly incompetent, or he fabricated his tes-
timony to "conform with the State's case against Paul House,
i.e., to fraudulently misrepresent the results to make him a po-
tential donor of that semen stain."40
Moreover, the testimony regarding the nightgown was also
false. Bigbee told the jury in crucial testimony that "the person
who deposited that semen was blood type A," although the
permissible scientific inference, as any competent serologist
knew, was that the "donor need not be an 'A secretor' like Paul
House, but could have been any man on the planet."41 This is
because in a mixed male-female stain, the female donor's
greater proportion of cells may 'mask"' male antigens; the A
stain could have originated entirely from the victim. 42
At trial, the prosecutor stated that "the fact that there was
semen on the outer garment"43 was the basis for seeking death,
as it would support a finding that House murdered the victim
"in the process of either rape or attempted rape."44 After all, the
bloodstains on House's jeans and the witness near the woods
connected House with a murder, but only the semen provided
any evidence of a rape.45 In response, House maintained his in-
nocence and attacked the forensic evidence. 46 The jury unani-
37. Id. at 25, 2005 WL 779581, at *18-19.
38. Id. at 25 & n.17, 2005 WL 779581, at *19 & n.13.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 26, 2005 WL 779591, at *19.
41. Id. at 26, 2005 WL 779591, at *20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id.
43. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 685 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2064
(2006).
44. Id. at 693.
45. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2074-75.
46. Id. at 2066.
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mously found three aggravating factors and, finding no mitigat-
ing factors outweighing them, sentenced him to death. 47
During his appeals, state and federal judges sharply di-
vided over how to handle new evidence of innocence uncovered
by House. In his direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court
called the trial evidence against House circumstantial but
"quite strong."48 Then, in House's subsequent pro se state ha-
beas petition, he defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim. 49 When House brought a federal habeas claim he
argued that the district court, under Schlup, should excuse this
procedural default based on evidence of actual innocence. 50
House's attorney presented newly discovered evidence, includ-
ing testimony from the State's medical examiner that the blood
on House's jeans likely came from the sample taken from the
victim after her body was discovered. 51 Half a vial of this sam-
ple was unaccounted for, and the State's medical examiner tes-
tified that law enforcement must have spilled it onto House's
pants, either accidentally or intentionally. 52 House also pre-
sented two witnesses who had known Mr. Muncey for years and
who said he had confessed to them that he murdered his wife,
several witnesses who said Muncey had physically assaulted
his wife, and two witnesses who contradicted Muncey's alibi.53
But most striking, as the Supreme Court would later note,
newly conducted DNA testing demonstrated "in direct contra-
diction of evidence presented at trial. . . that semen on Mrs.
47. At the sentencing stage, the State sought to prove three separate ag-
gravating factors to support a capital sentence:
(1) that House had previously been convicted of a felony involving the
use or threat of violence; (2) that the homicide was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind; and
(3) that the murder was committed while House was committing, at-
tempting to commit, or fleeing from the commission of, rape or kid-
napping.
Id. at 2074. The first factor was straightforward given House's prior aggra-
vated sexual assault conviction. As to the second two factors, the prosecutor
argued that, based on the serology evidence and the nature of the victim's in-
juries, she was raped and kidnapped. Id.
48. See State v. House, 743 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tenn. 1987), rev'd sub. nom,
House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
49. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2075.
50. Id. at 2075; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325-27 (1995).
51. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2080.
52. Id. at 2083.
53. Id. at 2084.
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Muncey's [clothing] . . . came from her husband,. . . not
House."54 Nevertheless, the district court, after an evidentiary
hearing regarding new evidence of innocence, denied relief.55
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit divided over which innocence
standards applied and which were satisfied. The initial panel
affirmed the district court's decision. 56 However, an en banc
circuit court changed course, concluding that House made a
compelling showing of actual innocence under the demanding
standard the Supreme Court announced in Herrera: in an ex-
traordinary case, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment might hypothetically prevent the execution of an
actually innocent person.57 The circuit also certified to the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court the question of whether state procedure
remained open. 58 But after the state court refused to answer
the certified questions, 59 the circuit reversed its en banc deci-
sion, with a narrow eight-judge majority ruling that House did
not meet his burden under Schlup to excuse the procedural de-
fault of his Strickland claim. 60 In contrast, the seven dissenting
judges concluded that not only had House met the Schlup bur-
den, but he made such a "persuasive" showing of innocence that
his conviction should be vacated under the Herrera standard. 61
Did House show that he was actually innocent, clearly
guilty, or somewhere in between? The Supreme Court, divided
5-3, ruled that House fell in between guilty and innocent. 62 By
showing that, more likely than not, no reasonable juror could
have found him guilty, House satisfied the Schlup standard. In
perhaps the most significant passage of the opinion, the Court
emphasized that the new DNA evidence was of "central impor-
tance," particularly because the proof at trial was circumstan-
tial, and because the evidence that the DNA testing contra-
54. Id. at 2078-79.
55. See id. at 2075.
56. Id.
57. See House v. Bell, 311 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Six judges
ruled to certify, with four dissenters arguing he could not obtain relief under
Schlup, much less Herrera. Id. at 780-81 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 768 (majority opinion).
59. See House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), rev'd,
126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
60. See id. at 685.
61. Id. at 708 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
62. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
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dicted "was the only forensic evidence at the scene that would
link House to the murder."63
The Court held that the DNA evidence, together with the
showing of forensic tampering with the blood evidence that the
prosecution introduced at trial and the testimony of witnesses
implicating Mr. Muncey, "cast considerable doubt on his
guilt."64 Despite the powerful showing of innocence, however,
the Court did not grant a new trial because under Schlup, de-
monstrating that a new jury would probably not convict merely
entitles the petitioner to pass through a "gateway" in which his
procedural default is excused and a court may reach the merits
of a claim. 65 Thus, the Court remanded for consideration of the
merits of the otherwise procedurally defaulted claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. 66
Yet even if House could have more powerfully shown his
innocence, the result might have stayed the same, as no doc-
trine currently permits relief beyond excusing a procedural de-
fault. The last time the issue came before the Court, in Herrera,
the Court did not decide whether an actual innocence claim ex-
isted.67 Similarly, in House, the Court ruled that "whatever
burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would re-
quire, this petitioner has not satisfied it."6s Therefore, under
current law, even a showing of innocence sufficient to prove
that, more likely than not, a jury would not find an individual
guilty, fails to merit a new trial.
A perverse result could have followed. Having satisfied the
very stringent Schlup standard, an individual like House might
nonetheless be denied relief under the less-stringent showing
required on his constitutional claim. Under the Strickland
analysis, House need only show a reasonable probability that
attorney ineffectiveness prejudiced the outcome. 69 However, the
failure to discover House's potentially exculpatory evidence in
time for the original trial might not be attributable to his coun-
sel's errors.70 Fortunately for House, and as I develop in Part
63. Id. at 2079.
64. Id. at 2087.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417-19 (1993).
68. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2087.
69. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
70. For example, if DNA testing was not available at the time of trial the
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II, his new evidence of innocence does at minimum impact the
prejudice inquiry for his underlying Strickland claim, providing
a potential ground for relief.
Indeed, the district court recently granted House's habeas
petition 71 and ordered his release pending the State's appeal.72
In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit will hear the case yet again.
Twenty-two years after his trial, House will leave death row
and return home. House is also now wheelchair-bound due to
an advanced case of multiple sclerosis.73 Should the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirm the grant of House's petition, the prosecutor stated
he plans to pursue a retrial. 74
B. ASSESSING THE PROBATIVE IMPACT OF NEW EVIDENCE OF
INNOCENCE
The House case represents the first time that the Court
confronted DNA evidence of innocence, recognized its "central"
importance, and engaged in a "holistic" analysis regarding its
effect on the prosecution's case. Before constructing the existing
framework of procedural and substantive rights relating to in-
nocence, I first step back to examine what the term "innocent"
means in connection with a criminal trial.
The word "innocence" is used casually in the media and by
lawyers, convicts, scholars, and courts. I define the innocent as
those who did not commit the charged crime. Even though they
lawyer would not be at fault, although the lawyer could have attacked forensic
evidence, like the FBI analyst's faulty testimony, or could have better develop-
ing evidence of third-party guilt.
71. See House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-883, 2007 WL 4568444, at *9 (E.D.
Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007) (granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus that will
result in a vacatur unless the State commences a new trial within 180 days
after the instant judgment becomes final); see also id. (noting the State's fail-
ure to disclose certain forensic evidence, and as to third party guilt, that "[i]n a
case such as this one . . . where the only evidence against petitioner was cir-
cumstantial and the theory of the defense was to shift suspicion from petition-
er to the victim's husband, it was incumbent on counsel to discover and
present all witnesses who could testify as to the husband's abuse of his wife
and thus lend credence to the defense theory").
72. House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-833, 2008 WL 972709, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
Apr. 7, 2008) (granting motion for release pending appeal).
73. Id., at *3 ("[House] now suffers from an advanced case of multiple
sclerosis, is unable to walk, and has been confined to a wheelchair for the past
several years.").
74. Rose French, Death Row Inmate Says No Reason to Retry Him-Could
Go Free if Tenn. Doesn't Pursue Case, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Apr. 17, 2008,
at B7, available at 2008 WLNR 7157135.
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know they are actually innocent, many lack the evidence to
prove their innocence to others, making it difficult to distin-
guish them from the convicts and prisoners who falsely claim
innocence. 75
People seek to prove innocence in several ways, including
through an alibi defense, a theory of third-party guilt, or an ar-
gument that no crime took place. Claims of innocence can be
made at different stages during the criminal process, including
during an investigation, as a defense theory at trial, or as a le-
gal claim during post-conviction appeals.
Furthermore, although some commentators casually refer
to DNA testing as potentially "conclusive" of innocence or guilt,
evidence typically cannot be conclusive of innocence or guilt.7 6
This is because all evidence must be evaluated in light of other
evidence and the elements of the crime or sentence. DNA evi-
dence, for example, is typically probative only as to the issue of
identity, which may or may not be contested in a given case. 77
Consequently, I suggest that any claim of innocence must be
evaluated based on its strength: namely, how the particular
evidence of innocence interacts with the evidence of guilt. I di-
vide claims of innocence into three classes: (1) substantial cas-
es, limited to those who can offer DNA or other evidence highly
probative of identity; (2) outcome-determinative cases, in which
DNA results, scientific evidence, or other evidence does not
substantially undercut the conviction, but undermines the con-
viction to some lesser degree, such that a reasonable jury would
not convict in light of the new evidence; 78 and (3) inconclusive
cases, in which it is equivocal whether the evidence tends to
show innocence. These categories represent points along a spec-
trum of the probative impact of exculpatory evidence.
75. See Garrett, supra note 4, app. C at 141-42 (providing suggestive data
regarding cases in which post-conviction DNA testing confirmed guilt). Fur-
ther, innocent recidivist low-level offenders may not only have little incentive
to pursue evidence of innocence, but they may typically accept guilty pleas ra-
ther than face pretrial detention and a possible conviction. See Josh Bowers,
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
76. Cf. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086 (2006) ("This is not a case of
conclusive exoneration.").
77. See id.; see also Anna Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA
Testing: Determining the Standard of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests,
31 CAP. U. L. REV. 243, 245 (2003) ("DNA alone does not prove guilt or inno-
cence, as DNA is only one piece of the evidence .....
78. See House, 126 S. Ct. at 2078.
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1. Substantial Claims of Innocence
The most powerfully supported innocence claims are
termed "complete exonerations," and involve cases in which
new evidence of innocence is highly dispositive of identity, per-
haps meeting an elevated "substantial" or "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence standard. DNA testing is currently most common-
ly relevant in cases involving sexual assaults committed by a
single person who is a stranger to the victim. 79 In such cases,
when DNA left by the perpetrator does not match the convict,
courts can convincingly resolve the issue of the perpetrator's
identity. Such evidence is significant because identity typically
is a central issue in several types of serious criminal cases with
stranger-perpetrators, including rapes and murders.
DNA evidence is different from traditional evidence of
identity, such as eyewitness testimony, confession testimony,
and physical evidence left at the scene of a crime. While other
evidence can lose reliability-the meaning of physical objects
left at a crime scene may be contested, memories of witnesses
may be uncertain and subject to deterioration over time, and
confessions may be coerced or false-DNA evidence is "uniquely
probative" and 'timeless"' if preserved and tested properly.8 0
DNA testing techniques have become more discerning,8 1 and
have established the gold standard for forensic evidence gener-
ally. Unlike many other forms of forensic science, DNA "offer[s]
data-based, probabilistic assessments of the meaning of eviden-
tiary 'matches."' 82 Indeed, scientists can now determine wheth-
er one person out of billions or trillions of people (many times
the number of all humans who have ever lived) could randomly
79. As more resources have been dedicated to DNA testing, DNA has been
increasingly used to exonerate or inculpate individuals in burglary cases and
other less serious felonies. See, e.g., Jeff Reinitz, DNA Database Closes Bur-
glary Cases, WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS COURIER (Iowa), Apr. 5, 2007, available
at 2007 WLNR 6551246.
80. See Innocence Project Brief, supra note 34, at 19, 2005 WL 779581, at
*13-14.
81. Cf. id. at 16, 2005 WL 779581, at *12 ("[T]he probative value of DNA
testing has been steadily increasing [due to] technological advances .... "
(quoting NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA
TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS (1999))).
82. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm
Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 893 (2005) ("DNA
typing can serve as a model for the traditional forensic sciences ....").
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match a DNA profile.8 3 DNA testing can be performed reliably
on a few dozen cells using the modern short tandem repeat
(STR) method, and the science continues to advance to permit
testing of smaller samples.8 4 DNA evidence may also contain
proof of its origin at the crime scene, where typical rape case
samples contain a mixture of the perpetrator's semen or saliva
and the victim's epithelial cells.8 5 This is not to say that DNA
testing is foolproof. Human error or misconduct can lead to un-
sound results or analysis. A series of DNA laboratories have
been investigated for systemic errors, and at least three indi-
viduals have been wrongly convicted based on faulty DNA test-
ing or analysis.8 6
More recently, DNA evidence has become important in pro-
ceedings following an individual's conviction. Post-conviction
DNA testing was first used to exonerate an innocent man in
1989, clearing Gary Dotson after ten years of incarceration in
Illinois.8 7 Two hundred and sixteen innocent people have now
been exonerated post-conviction.88  In addition to post-
conviction exonerations, many more people have been cleared
by DNA results during criminal investigations and at trial.8 9
83. See Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming admission of DNA testimony that one in 234 billion people shared a
profile); NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING 19 (2000) (noting that the
statistical probability of a thirteen-STR-loci DNA match between two unre-
lated persons in the Caucasian American population has been estimated at
one in 575 trillion); Edward K. Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA
Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 649, 649 (2005) ("DNA evidence comes pre-
packaged with all the indicia of scientific reliability: population statistics, pre-
defined and pre-tested procedural standards, and known error rates.").
84. See also 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 30:23, at 149, § 30:31 n.4, at 161 (2007); cf. BUTLER, supra note 35, at 146-48
(explaining the usefulness of the STR method with degraded DNA samples).
85. See Keith A. Findley, New Laws Reflect the Power and Potential of
DNA, WIS. LAW., May 2002, at 20, 23.
86. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 84 n.109.
87. See Rob Warden, Executive Dir., Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Gary
Dotson: The Rape That Wasn't-The First DNA Exoneration in Illinois, http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc/exonerations/ilDotsonSummary.html (last vi-
sited Apr. 26, 2008).
88. The Innocence Project, supra note 3.
89. See, e.g., William S. Sessions, DNA Evidence and the Death Penalty,
JURIST, May 30, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/05/dna-evidence
-and-death-penalty.php ("In approximately 25 percent of cases the genetic evi-
dence recovered during an investigation does not match the DNA of the sus-
pect.").
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Such powerful showings of innocence can be made in non-
DNA cases where nonscientific evidence may undercut the con-
viction so substantially as to make a vacatur necessary. For in-
stance, in colonial times when people were less easy to locate,
murder convictions were vacated when the supposed victim re-
surfaced, alive and well.90 While courts often regarded new ex-
culpatory evidence-such as recantations-with suspicion,
courts have reversed convictions based on convincing presenta-
tions of such evidence. 91 Today, although the vast majority of
prisoners lack relevant DNA from the crime scene, 92 they may
increasingly benefit from new technology-based evidence that
also contains strong indicia of reliability, such as video evi-
dence. 93 Additionally, DNA evidence may result in a "partial
exoneration" by demonstrating that a sentence for a crime was
improper and resulting in relief just as to that aspect of the
sentence. 94 Such partial exonerations may arise when the evi-
90. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, at xviii (1932)
(recounting eight examples where, after murder convictions, the victim resur-
faced "hale and hearty" and in some the convict "was saved from hanging or
electrocution by a hairbreadth").
91. Examples recounted by Edwin Borchard in his pioneering book in-
cluded: corroborated confessions of third parties, unusual modus operandi and
a continued pattern of crimes after conviction, and corroborated confessions by
accomplices who exclude the convict as a participant. See id. at xix.
92. See Protecting the Innocent: Proposals to Reform the Death Penalty:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 221 (2002) (state-
ment of Barry Scheck, Co-Director, Innocence Project) ("The vast majority
(probably 80%) of felony cases do not involve biological evidence that can be
subjected to DNA testing.").
93. The Court's decision to remand for consideration whether actual inno-
cence should excuse procedural default in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 303
(1995), emphasized the probative power of video evidence. The Court's decision
last Term in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007), similarly empha-
sized, in the civil rights context, the probative power of video evidence. With
video surveillance increasing, as well as the fact that video cameras are in-
creasingly incorporated into cell phones and PDA's, video may provide a more
important source for alibi evidence in the future. Other electronic evidence
may provide a similar degree of certainty. For example, an electronic signa-
ture from an ATM machine or a credit card with a signature may show a per-
son's physical location.
94. Those cases may not often arise because disproving identity will typi-
cally exonerate and will not merely result in a sentence reduction. Further,
challenging a capital sentence-even with evidence of innocence-is very diffi-
cult under current law. For example, if a capital habeas petitioner procedural-
ly defaults on a claim, the Court requires a "clear and convincing" showing
that both the elements of the crime and the aggravating factors would not
have been found but for an underlying constitutional violation. See Sawyer v.
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dence exonerates an individual of a crime that served as a pre-
dicate crime, or that constituted a sentence-enhancing prior
conviction. 95
2. Outcome-Determinative Claims of Innocence
In a second category of cases, new evidence of innocence
does not substantially disprove identity or elements of the con-
viction or sentence. Nevertheless, it undermines the conviction
more generally, and under an outcome-based standard, to such
a degree that no new jury would reasonably convict. In House,
DNA testing negated a significant piece of forensic evidence
that linked House to the murder, and it undermined any evi-
dence that the motive was rape, which was one of the aggravat-
ing factors supporting the death sentence. 96 The Court em-
ployed a "holistic judgment"-an evaluation of the evidence in
the context of the entire criminal record-to determine whether
a new jury would still convict. 97 Thus, under this approach,
DNA results that exclude an individual may not demonstrate
lack of identity, but it may show that key facts introduced at
trial, and likely to have powerfully affected the jury's decision,
were false.98
3. Indeterminate Cases
Toward the other end of the spectrum, new evidence of in-
nocence can have so little exculpatory power as to be inconclu-
sive. DNA test results can be inconclusive if insufficient biolog-
ical material remained, or if what remained was degraded.
Furthermore, where it is unclear if the perpetrator actually left
biological evidence at the crime scene, DNA may not be proba-
tive of identity. In many cases, the defendant did not dispute
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1992). Several circuits extended the Court's
rulings to noncapital sentencing, in the context of a showing of innocence to
excuse a procedural default. See Matthew Mattingly, Note, Actually Less
Guilty: The Extension of the Actual Innocence Exception to the Sentencing
Phase of Non-Capital Cases, 93 KY. L.J. 531, 531 (2004-2005).
95. Cf., e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004).
96. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078-79 (2006).
97. See id. at 2078 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328).
98. The situation when the jury heard facts that were false increasingly
confronts courts. The Innocence Project argued to the Supreme Court that
"DNA has revealed a finite but troubling class of convictions tainted by what is
best described as 'false facts."' Innocence Project Brief, supra note 34, at 3,
2005 WL 779581. at *3.
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identity at trial, but rather raised a justification defense such
as self-defense or consent, and if identity cannot be credibly
disputed, the new DNA evidence might not significantly under-
cut the State's case. 99 Additionally, DNA testing may be inde-
terminate if the test results match co-perpetrators.
The vast majority of claims of innocence fall into this third
category. Courts struggle with claims of new evidence of inno-
cence, particularly those that depend on less reliable forms of
evidence. 100 Thus, for instance, since a witness's memory may
become less trustworthy with the passage of time, courts have
ruled that even where the conviction rested on a single witness,
that individual's recantation cannot support a vacatur.10 1 Along
the way to that outcome, however, hard questions occur at the
borderlines between substantial, outcome-determinative, and
inconclusive cases. Many courts adopt opaque reasoning on
such complex matters that fails to focus on the probative power
of such evidence. To explore this conclusion, Part II considers
how our existing federal and state systems evaluate innocence.
99. See, e.g., People v. Gholston, 697 N.E.2d 375, 378-79 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (denying a motion for DNA testing on the basis that such testing could
not exculpate where the defendant was found guilty of committing a sexual
assault of a woman with accomplices, there was no evidence he ejaculated, and
where he was also found guilty of a robbery and battery of two male victims).
DNA evidence may also support a self-defense or consent theory.
100. Michael Risinger argues for a more "radical" approach: that showings
of innocence that could not satisfy an actual innocence claim should neverthe-
less be credited by trial and appellate courts, and exploring a new category of
"unsafe" verdicts. D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Re-
formed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41
Hous. L. REV. 1281, 1334-36 (2004).
101. See Paul von Zielbauer, Accusers Recant, but Hopes Still Fade in Sing
Sing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at Al (describing a case in which courts re-
jected appeals where the only evidence of guilt, five eyewitnesses, all recanted
their testimony, citing "the prevailing wisdom of the American justice system,
which views recantations as untrustworthy, acts not of conscience, but of sym-
pathy or bribery or coercion"); see also Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231,
1233 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay of ex-
ecution) ("Recantation testimony is properly viewed with great suspicion.");
People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733, 736 (N.Y. 1916) ("There is no form of proof
so unreliable as recanting testimony. In the popular mind it is often regarded
as of great importance. Those experienced in the administration of the crimi-
nal law know well its untrustworthy character."); Janice J. Repka, Comment,
Rethinking the Standard for New Trial Motions Based upon Recantations as
Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1433, 1434-35 (1986); Daniel
Wolf, Note, I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New Trial in False Testimo-
ny Cases, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (1985).
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II. INNOCENCE AND LEGAL CHANGE
This Part explores the effect of DNA testing on the crimi-
nal system. DNA testing, by providing compelling resolution of
identity, has reshaped the criminal system. Nevertheless, the
system fails to simply examine the probative impact of new
evidence of innocence. At each stage of the criminal process dif-
ferent rules apply, but during each stage scientific proof of
identity-particularly DNA evidence-has created a new re-
gime increasingly focused on claims of innocence. That regime,
however, remains tied to an old world in which strict barriers
obstruct the path to freedom of an innocent convict. Part II.A
begins by discussing the transformative effect of DNA-testing
technology on criminal investigations. Next, Part II.B discusses
how claims of innocence are litigated during criminal trials.
Part II.C discusses state appeals and post-conviction review,
including the profusion of statutes that now provide for access
to post-conviction DNA testing. Finally, Part II.D discusses in-
nocence in the context of federal habeas corpus, in which there
is no freestanding constitutional innocence claim, but where
innocence and access to DNA is increasingly litigated.
A. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
DNA changed the nature of criminal investigations in a
range of cases by making it possible to exculpate or inculpate
suspects. Typically, law enforcement investigates evidence of
innocence, such as alibi evidence or evidence of a third party's
guilt, to assess the reliability of its cases. Police are also trained
to test the memory of witnesses using identification procedures
like lineups; similarly, during interrogations they test the sus-
pect's account against crime-scene details. 102 Such investigative
techniques are not foolproof, but they aim for accuracy, and
criminal procedure rules prohibit methods with high risks of
error, such as coercive interrogations. 103
By quickly providing dispositive evidence as to identity,
DNA testing changes the investigative process, especially in
stranger-rape cases. For example, in Virginia, DNA analysis
102. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Richard A.
Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interroga-
tion, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 438 (1998).
103. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223, 226 (1973).
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eliminates twenty-five to thirty percent of suspects in police in-
vestigations.104 Nationally, early in the DNA era when local po-
lice sent samples to the FBI for testing, about twenty-five per-
cent of primary suspects were excluded.1 0 5 In the twenty-five
percent of cases where testing excludes prime suspects, pre-
sumably the prime suspect was identified through some other
method, such as eyewitness identification or interrogation.
Therefore, DNA may not only call into question traditional in-
vestigatory methods and shed light on particular erroneous in-
vestigations, but the availability of DNA may more broadly
change the way that police investigate cases. For example, law
enforcement may prioritize cases in which DNA testing can be
conducted.106 In other cases, law enforcement may use DNA as
a tool to enhance other investigative techniques, such as inter-
rogation. Police, for example, may falsely tell a suspect that his
DNA matches during interrogation to elicit a confession.10 7
Moreover, DNA inculpates large numbers of suspects, some
of whom otherwise would never have been located.10 8 The mod-
ern national DNA databank system, Combined DNA Index Sys-
tem (CODIS), arose from federal legislation1 09 and pools fifty
state databanks with the federal databank created by the FBI
104. See All Things Considered: DNA Gathering (NPR radio broadcast July
27, 2000).
105. See Barry C. Scheck, Barry Scheck Lectures on Wrongful Convictions,
54 DRAKE L. REV. 597, 601 (2006); see also EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRI-
AL, at xxviii (1996). That twenty-five percent figure for FBI exclusions still
holds true. See Sessions, supra note 89.
106. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Sus-
pects Go Free, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at Al ("[Tlhe New Jersey's Essex
County prosecutor has established an unwritten rule discouraging pursuit of
cases that rely on a single witness, and those in which witness statements are
not extensively corroborated by forensic evidence.").
107. See State v. Chirokovskcic, 860 A.2d 986, 988-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004).
108. Indeed, DNA has helped not only to catch serial rapists, but has
linked together crimes that police, when relying on traditional evidence, had
thought to be unrelated. Cf. ADVANCED JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY
1-4 (2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/justice/dnainitiative-policy_
book.pdf (discussing examples where DNA aided law enforcement).
109. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 210301-
210306, 108 Stat. 1796, 2065-71 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in 1990.110 These databanks contain over three million profiles,
and their size continues to expand, particularly since all fifty
states and the federal government enacted laws permitting col-
lection of DNA from those convicted of serious felonies.111 The
federal government and twelve states collect DNA profiles from
detainees and arrestees who are never charged, and additional
states are considering similar expansions. 112
As a result of this information, DNA evidence that excul-
pates the convict can also inculpate a new individual. For ex-
ample, more than one-third of the first two hundred post-
conviction DNA exonerations resulted in the inculpation of the
actual perpetrator, with most of these matches the result of a
"cold hit" in a DNA databank. 113 The availability of such power-
ful evidence of guilt has also resulted in legal changes to make
new prosecutions possible. This evolution began when prosecu-
tors evaded the statute of limitations by using "John Doe DNA
indictments," in which they indicted the DNA profile itself.114
Several states have recently passed laws that relax statutes of
limitations in DNA cases to permit such prosecutions. 115 Thus,
110. Cf. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dep't of Justice, CODIS: Combined
DNA Index System 2 (2007), available at http:www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/pdf/
codisbrochure2.pdf ("Today, over 170 public law enforcement laboratories par-
ticipate in [a National DNA Index System] across the United States.").
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (Supp. V 2007); Michelle Hibbert, DNA
Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 767, 774-75 (1999).
112. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (Supp. 2008); TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 411.1471 (Vernon Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (Supp.
2007); see also Kevin Johnson, States Expand Taking of DNA, USA TODAY,
April 14, 2008 at 1A, available at 2008 WLNR 6945263 (noting that twelve
states now "permit sampling for some or all felony arrests, up from five in
2006" and that "[a]nother 21 are considering such proposals"); Julia Preston,
U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2007, at Al ("Federal Bureau of Investigation officials said they anticipated an
increase ranging from 250,000 to as many as 1 million samples a year. The
laboratory currently receives about 96,000 samples a year .....
113. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 119.
114. For statutes extending the statute of limitations in sexual assault cas-
es, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(b)(1)(B) (2006), CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-193b (2007), FLA. STAT. § 775.15 (15) (2007), and GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-3-1(c.1) (2004). For states extending the statute of limitations for all
crimes, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(i)-) (2006), DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 3107(a) (2007), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(c) (West 2005).
115. See Meredith A. Bieber, Comment, Meeting the Statute or Beating It:
Using "John Doe" Indictments Based on DNA to Meet the Statute of Limita-
tions, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1079 n.1 (2002). Interestingly, Arkansas opens
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in addition to changing investigative techniques, DNA has af-
fected rules of finality for prosecution.
B. CRIMINAL TRIALS
Although law enforcement has strong incentives to pursue
DNA evidence of guilt, the same incentives do not exist to pur-
sue DNA evidence of innocence. Further, our criminal proce-
dure rules do not yet sufficiently ensure full access at trial to
this most powerful evidence of innocence. Due process rules
should be understood to provide complete access to DNA and
other evidence of innocence at trial. Wrongful convictions will
persist, however, unless courts ensure that evidence of inno-
cence is fully disclosed at the time of trial.
Innocence is typically claimed in two ways at trial: through
an alibi defense or through evidence of third-party guilt. Alibi
defenses traditionally involve calling witnesses to testify that
the defendant was not at the scene of the crime. In contrast,
claims pointing to third-party guilt typically involve highlight-
ing evidence that suggests another, possibly unknown, individ-
ual committed the crime. These claims have not received much
judicial or scholarly attention, but have long played an impor-
tant role in criminal proceedings. 116 Indeed, in my Judging In-
nocence study, four out of eighteen reversals obtained by the
exonerees were due to appellate or post-conviction courts re-
versing based on the trial court's improper exclusion or the
State's suppression of evidence of third-party guilt. 117 Impor-
tantly, while states have long adhered to much-criticized rules
that limit the ability to present evidence of third-party guilt at
trial, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that due process
entitles a defendant to present a theory of third-party guilt, at
least in the face of overly restrictive state rules. 118
its statute to extension not just in DNA cases, but expecting other advances, to
any "test that may become available through an advance in technology." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(b)(1)(B) (providing such an extension only for rape cas-
es).
116. See, e.g., Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production
on the Defendant Before Admitting Evidence That Someone Else Committed
the Crime Charged: Is It Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 272 (1997); Brett C.
Powell, Comment, Perry Mason Meets the "Legitimate Tendency" Standard of
Admissibility (and Doesn't Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1023
(2001).
117. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 104.
118. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1735 (2006) (holding
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In addition to alibi and third-party-guilt evidence of inno-
cence, DNA evidence also may take on a central role in a crimi-
nal trial: DNA evidence is now admissible at trial in all
states.119 Law enforcement has strong incentives to conduct
DNA testing before trial to prove guilt. Courts have held that
uncorroborated inculpating DNA tests, standing alone, suffice
to prove guilt.120 Thus, in cases in which identity is the primary
issue, cases with DNA inculpations typically result in guilty
pleas, while those with DNA exclusions may often lead the
prosecutor to drop the case. Additionally, DNA test results can
bolster an alibi by showing lack of identity, and a "cold hit" in a
DNA databank can provide powerful evidence of third-party
guilt.
Commentators have observed that "[t]hese days, DNA test-
ing is common on the front end of prosecutions, meaning that in
a few years, the window that the 200 exonerations has opened
on the justice system will close." 121 Though DNA testing is now
routine before trials, that window may close more slowly than
mdny have supposed. Of the 211 post-conviction DNA exonera-
tions from 1989 through the end of 2007, more than one-fourth,
fifty-five individuals, were convicted even though DNA testing
was available at the time of their trials.122
that a court may not exclude probative evidence of third-party guilt based on
the strength of the state's case). For an invaluable set of criticisms of the "di-
rect connection" doctrine, as well as a discussion of the manner in which Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804 and similar state rules "uniquely disfavor[] state-
ments ... offered by a defendant in a criminal case to show that someone else
might have committed the crime," see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott,
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L.
REV. 291, 343-46. The direct-connection doctrine "limits admissibility to evi-
dence that not only has a 'tendency' to make the defendant's guilt 'less proba-
ble,' but that also has a 'direct connection' to the crime." Id.
119. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 83,
at 24; Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification
Evidence, 84 A.L.R.4TH 313 (1991).
120. As a New York court put it, "the testimony of even one DNA expert
that there is a genetic match . . . is legally sufficient to support a guilty ver-
dict." See People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 672
N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. Div. 1998).
121. Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises Questions Beyond
DNA, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at Al (describing the results of Garrett, su-
pra note 4).
122. DNA was first used in a post-conviction case in 1989 in the United
States. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 57.
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Figure 1. Annual DNA Exonerations and DNA-Era Convictions 123
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As Figure 1 shows, the annual rate of DNA exonerations
increased over time (with variation from year to year). Howev-
er, the graph also shows a persistent proportion of DNA exone-
rations of people convicted in the DNA era. Moreover, this pro-
portion has a gradual, though uneven, rise. 124 This suggests
that exonerations will not readily disappear despite the in-
creased use of DNA testing during criminal investigations. A
range of reasons explain why these individuals were convicted,
notwithstanding the availability of DNA testing at trial; these
findings are summarized in Table 1, below.
123. The data compiled reflecting the number of DNA exonerees in each
year and the year of conviction can also be viewed on the Innocence Project's
website, which displays that information in a chart. See The Innocence
Project, Know the Cases: Browse the Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
124. Of the five exonerations that have occurred so far in 2008, three, those
of Ronald Gene Taylor, Kennedy Brewer, and Nathaniel Hatchett, involved
post-1990 convictions. See id.
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Table 1. Convictions of the Innocent in the DNA Era (1990-2007)125
Reason Why DNA Testing Did Not Number Percent (of the 55 DNA
Exonerate at the Time of Trial Era Exonerees)
DNA technology advanced beyond 21 38
that available at the time of trial
Found guilty despite DNA testing that 12 22
excluded
State forensic experts concealed or 10 18
misrepresented DNA evidence
Attorney failed to request DNA 13 24
Court denied DNA request 5 9
The reasons for ongoing convictions of the innocent in the
DNA era include: advances in DNA technology, conviction de-
spite DNA exclusion, forensic fraud or error, attorney ineffec-
tiveness, or court denial of a DNA testing request. For some ex-
onerees, more than one reason applied. Each of these reasons
suggests why wrongful convictions will still occur unless our
system recognizes that due process requires meaningful access
to evidence of innocence at the time of trial.
1. Improvements in DNA Technology
Twenty-one of the exonerees were convicted in the DNA
era because DNA technology at the time was too primitive to
exonerate the individual. 126 Early Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphism (RFLP) testing permitted results only where
fairly large quantities of biological material were available for
testing. 127 Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) testing, which be-
came widely available in the early 1990s, provided an advance
125. Information regarding the reasons why DNA testing was or was not
conducted at trial was compiled from available news reports and in several
instances, from discussions with counsel. For several exonerees, more than
one reason was implicated. See Brandon L. Garrett, Database: Post-DNA Ex-
onerations (on file with author).
126. The exonerees are R. Alexander, A. Beaver, R. Brown, A. Coco, S.
Cowans, R. Criner, R. Danziger, A. Dominguez, W. Gregory, C. Heins, P. Kor-
donowy, R. Krone, M. Mercer, N. Miller, M. Mitchell, J. O'Donnell, A. Powell,
P. Rose, F. Saecker, D. Warney, and K. Wyniemko. See id.
127. See BUTLER, supra note 35, at 33-35.
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in DNA testing by permitting testing of more minute pieces of
evidence. 128 Short tandem repeat (STR) testing, first conducted
in 1991 but not widely adopted until the mid-to-late 1990s,
permitted amplification of DNA, as well as examination of
short fragments of DNA that are more likely to be preserved. 129
These improvements in technology were one reason why the
annual rate of DNA exonerations sharply increased in the mid-
to-late 1990s. 130 Additional advances that enabled new exone-
rations included the advent in the late 1990s of mitochondrial
DNA testing, which is useful for the testing of hair, and of Y-
STR testing in 2003, which permits testing on the Y chromo-
some. 131 Assuming that genetic science and technology continue
to improve, innocence claims will continue to be important, par-
ticularly as the cost of testing falls and the speed of testing in-
creases.
Related to improvements in technology, the expansion of
DNA databanks provided an important source for evidence of
third-party guilt, creating the possibility of a cold hit-a match
in a DNA database-with the perpetrator. Almost one-fourth of
the first two hundred post-conviction DNA exonerations in-
volved such a cold hit.132 Strikingly, in several cases, even after
DNA excluded a convict, the State did not concede innocence
until a cold hit occurred. 133 Since databanks continually grow
in size, the likelihood that a cold hit will occur continues to
grow. As these databases continue to expand, an important,
unresolved constitutional question is whether Brady v. Mary-
land entitles a defendant to obtain potentially exculpatory dis-
covery from a database search conducted on DNA found at a
128. Id.
129. See id. at 11 (providing a timeline of advances in DNA technology).
130. See supra fig.1.
131. See generally BUTLER, supra note 35, at 201-98 (providing helpful
background information about these types of testing). For example, Wilton
Dedge's exoneration in 2004 rested on mitochondrial and Y-STR testing, The
Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Wilton Dedge, http://www
.innocenceproject.org/Content/84.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008), and James
Waller's exoneration also rested on Y-STR testing, The Innocence Project,
Know the Cases: James Waller, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/439
.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
132. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 119.
133. The case of Douglas Warney provides an example, see Innocence
Project, Know the Cases: Douglas Warney, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/281.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008), as do the twelve cases discussed
infra note 403.
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crime scene. 134 While several states limit post-conviction DNA
testing to cases involving improvements in DNA technology,
few provide access to testing where databank searches may lo-
cate the perpetrator. Illinois and Ohio explicitly provide a sta-
tutory right to a CODIS DNA databank search at the post-
conviction stage, while a few states have statutory rights to a
CODIS search at the time of trial. 135 The Brady due process
rule should be understood to ensure a defendant's access to
such powerful evidence of third-party guilt both at the time of
trial and at the post-conviction stage.
2. Conviction Despite DNA Exclusion at Trial
Over twenty percent of these exonerees convicted in the
DNA era, or twelve individuals convicted during the time pe-
riod discussed, were found guilty despite the existence of exclu-
sionary DNA testing at the time of their criminal trials. 136 In
each case, the prosecution had a theory to explain the DNA ex-
clusion. All twelve of these convictions were vacated only upon
the occurrence of a cold hit in the CODIS database or a DNA
match with a subsequently identified suspect. 137
3. Forensic Evidence Concealed or Misrepresented
Eighteen percent of these exonerees, or ten individuals,
were exonerated because state crime laboratories failed to con-
duct DNA testing despite its availability, including because po-
tentially exculpatory DNA evidence was concealed or improper-
134. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Federal DNA statutes are
premised in part on a recognition that "[ilt is crucial for defendants to have
access to the CODIS system in circumstances that possibly establish inno-
cence." United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2002)
(quoting 146 CONG. REC. H8578 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Jackson-Lee)), aff'd, 473 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2007); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-
900, pt. 1, at 10 (2000), as reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2325 (discuss-
ing a backlog of DNA samples in crime labs and commenting that "the current
inadequacies of the system.., endanger the innocent").
135. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-5 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.74(A)-(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). For statutes permitting a CODIS
search before trial, see, for example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-267(c) (2007).
136. The cases are those of J. Deskovic, C. Elkins, T. Hayes, E. Karage, R.
Krone, R. Matthews, A. McCray, J. Ochoa, K. Richardson, R. Santana, Y. Sa-
laam, and K. Wise. Krone was retried and found guilty and sentenced to life in
prison despite DNA testing conducted before his second trial. See Garrett, su-
pra note 125.
137. See, e.g., People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
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ly reported as inculpatory, or because results were fabricated
by the state forensic experts. 138 Such cases highlight the need
for courts to ensure complete disclosure of laboratory notes and
reports related to the testing of DNA and other biological ma-
terial.139 These categories of cases do not include the far more
substantial number of cases involving improper use of non-
DNA forensic analysis in exoneration cases, such as serology or
microscopic hair comparison.140 Moreover, a series of corruption
scandals at major forensic laboratories has recently resulted in
exonerations. As a result, several state laboratories have begun
conducting unprecedented audits and retesting thousands of
old cases to uncover flawed forensic testing at trial. 14 1 As a re-
138. The cases are those of G. Alejandro, T. Durham, H. Gonzalez, A. Gos-
sett, D. Holland, M. Pendleton, M. Mercer, J. Sutton, A. Villasana, and J. Wil-
lis. See Garrett, supra note 125. Michael Mercer's case is included here, but
presents close and unresolved issues based on news reports. In that case, "[a]
serologist told both juries that an analysis of slides taken for a rape kit had
revealed no evidence of sperm," and, as a result, DNA testing was denied on
appeal. Robert D. McFadden, DNA Clears Rape Convict After 12 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2003, at B1. However, it is possible that a serologist using
proper methods would not detect any evidence of sperm, and that it was the
appellate court that improperly denied access to more sophisticated DNA test-
ing. An additional case, that of Ronald Taylor, is a 2008 exoneration. See The
Innocence Project, DNA Testing Proves That Houston Man Was Wrongfully
Convicted of Rape in 1995; Case Highlights Serious HPD Crime Lab Problems,
Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/915.php.
139. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 84.
140. The use of forensic science in the criminal trials of DNA exonerees is
the subject of a work in progress finding improper forensic science testimony
by State analysts to have been pervasive in exonerees' trials. See Brandon L.
Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Improper Forensic Science and Wrongful Convic-
tions, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
141. For example, the Virginia lab has begun retesting years after the Gov-
ernor ordered an audit. After assembling thousands of files to test, the labora-
tory estimated that thirty exonerations might result. This estimate may be
quite conservative when two of the first thirty tested were exonerated. See
Frank Green, State's DNA Project Is Slow Going, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.),
Aug. 26, 2007, at Al (describing the limited progress of a Virginia retesting
project); Maryland Police Reviewing 480 DNA Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2003, available at 2003 WLNR 5247183 ("Baltimore County police are review-
ing 480 cases worked on by a former department chemist who testified at a
1983 rape trial against a defendant who was later exonerated."); Candace
Rondeaux, Virginia DNA Review Hobbled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, at B1
(quoting the Virginia's state crime laboratory director admitting "[w]e could
see as many as 30 possible exonerations when this is all over with"); Robert
Tanner, State Efforts to Check Crime Lab Work Stall Minnesota and Two Oth-
er States Find Their New Forensics Oversight Boards Are Thwarted by Politics
and Funding, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Mar. 25, 2007, available at
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sult, we can expect additional DNA exonerations in the near fu-
ture. In the interim, the focus of post-conviction DNA exonera-
tions may change from uncovering the unreliability of
traditional forensic sciences, such as hair comparison and blood
serology, to uncovering human failures or fraud in DNA labora-
tories. Paradoxically, DNA laboratories are currently far more
carefully regulated than those performing other forensic tech-
niques.142
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors violate due
process if they knowingly introduce perjured testimony at tri-
al.143 If, however, prosecutors merely conceal evidence of inno-
cence, including DNA test results, the defense may never learn
of a fabrication, even though the Brady rule requires that pros-
ecutors disclose and turn over to the defense all of the poten-
tially exculpatory evidence in the State's control.144 Recognizing
this problem, the District of Columbia passed a statute requir-
ing the prosecutor to disclose in open court the existence of any
"physical evidence seized or recovered" during an investigation
"which may contain biological material," and any DNA test re-
sults. 145 The statute also offers the opportunity for the defense
to request or waive DNA testing.146 As this statute recognizes,
the Brady mandate is particularly important in the DNA con-
text: as one court put it, "Given the well-known powerful excul-
patory effect of DNA testing, confidence in the jury's finding of
2007 WLNR 5946827 (describing how state forensic review commissions in
Minnesota, Texas, and Virginia have yet to reopen a case due to lack of fund-
ing or a flat refusal to do so). Private laboratories have also had fabrication
scandals. See, e.g., Laura Cadiz, Md.-Based DNA Lab Fires Analyst over Falsi-
fied Tests, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2004, at Al (describing the firing of an analyst
engaging in fabrication at the prominent Orchid Cellmark laboratory).
142. All public DNA laboratories are now required to be accredited and to
undergo external audits at least every two years, based on the requirements of
the 2004 Justice for All Act. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (Supp. V 2007); Paul C.
Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 210 & n.339 (2007).
143. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney v. Hollohan, 294
U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
144. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963). Although Brady noted
that this duty existed upon request from the defense, the Supreme Court later
clarified that the duty existed with a specific request, general request, or no
request at all. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
145. D.C. CODE § 22-4132 (Supp. 2007).
146. Id.
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plaintiff's guilt at his past trial, where such evidence was not
considered, would be undermined."'' 4 7
Yet, because courts do not understand how the uniquely
probative nature of DNA evidence can alter the Brady analysis,
they fail to properly apply the Brady rule. Courts are divided,
with some granting and some denying relief for the conceal-
ment of biological material in the original trial. The cases of
Dale Brison and Darryl Hunt starkly illustrate the contrasting
approaches courts have taken. In Dale Brison's case, the state
court ordered DNA testing, finding that a failure to do so would
violate Brady.148 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Dar-
ryl Hunt could not make a Brady claim when the State's attor-
ney falsely told his lawyer at the time of trial that the biological
material was "too degraded to be tested," even after initial DNA
testing excluded Hunt.149 Instead, the court held Hunt's lawyer
"had equal access to the fluid samples, and thus he was under
an independent duty to pursue testing alternatives." 150 Thus,
even in cases involving exonerees, courts dismiss claims re-
garding the State's concealment of crucial biological evidence
that would have undermined the State's case. As these cases
demonstrate, current constitutional rules like Brady do not
adequately ensure the availability or reliability of DNA testing,
despite its newfound importance in criminal trials.
4. Trial Counsel Failure to Request DNA Testing
More than one-fifth of the exonerees, or thirteen individu-
als, did not receive DNA testing at trial because defense attor-
neys failed to request it.151 Of those thirteen exonerees, only
three later brought a Strickland claim alleging constitutionally
ineffective counsel. 152 One of the three exonerees, Brian
147. Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp.
2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715 (Cal. 1998)
(noting a prosecutor's duty to turn over suppressed drug test results).
148. Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 424-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(remanding for DNA testing, finding that DNA evidence was exculpatory evi-
dence that should have been disclosed under Brady).
149. Hunt v. McDade, No. 98-6808, 2000 WL 219755, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb.
25, 2000).
150. Id.
151. See supra tbl.1.
152. Anthony Hicks also brought such a claim, but only after the DNA test-
ing had already exonerated him, and thus he received a reversal. See infra
notes 162-63, 320 and accompanying text.
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Piszczek, lost his claim in the Ohio state appellate court, which
ruled that the DNA testing would not have helped his defense
given the victim's apparently reliable identification of him as
the perpetrator. 15 3 Similarly, in the case of Josiah Sutton, a
state appellate court ruled that the trial lawyer "(1) [] informed
appellant's family he would need more money for the analysis
to be performed but they failed to pay it; and (2) there were no
unadulterated samples left for independent analysis."'15 4 The
Court added that "appellate counsel d[id] not produce any evi-
dence of independent DNA analysis that would vindicate appel-
lant."155 The case of Mark Bravo was slightly different, because
his attorneys claimed to have requested DNA before trial.156
The prosecutors, however, denied receiving any request and the
trial court denied a defense request for a continuance to send
the evidence to a laboratory in Maryland. 157 Nevertheless, the
appellate court found no prejudice, on the theory that "[tihe
tests may not have been possible or if possible, the results
might have been inculpatory."'' 58 A dissenter argued that DNA
testing should be permitted because it might prove Bravo's in-
nocence, which ultimately occurred. 159
In this complex catch-22 lies what Seth Kreimer and David
Rudovsky have called the "double helix, double bind."'160 Al-
though courts may cite defense counsel's independent obliga-
tion to request DNA testing in support of their refusal to reme-
dy the prosecution's failure to accurately disclose the nature of
biological evidence, defense counsel's failure to request the
DNA testing may not result in relief for the innocent appellant.
This is especially true since, under the deferential Strickland
inquiry, "a particular decision not to investigate must be direct-
153. State v. Piszczek, No. 62203, 1993 WL 106966, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 8, 1993).
154. Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349, at *2 (Tex. App.
Jan. 18, 2001).
155. Id.
156. People v. Bravo, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1993).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 61 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he DNA test for which ap-
pellant sought a continuance could supply admissible evidence which would
offer compelling if not conclusive proof of his innocence.").
160. Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Fac-
tual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547 (2002).
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ly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, apply-
ing a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments."161
Hence, a failure to request ultimately exculpatory DNA testing
might not, and frequently did not, earn relief on appeal. The
lone exception among the exonerees was Anthony Hicks, who
succeeded on a Strickland claim since, although his attorney
"knew that the root tissue of hair specimens could be subject to
DNA testing ... [hie did not discuss this with his client or with
the district attorney, or petition the court to have this test per-
formed or do anything to pursue such testing."'162 The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court found ineffective assistance of counsel-but
only after DNA testing had already excluded Hicks. 163
While courts denying Brady claims seem to place the bur-
den on defense lawyers to obtain DNA evidence, defense law-
yers may have difficulty evaluating the State's forensic evi-
dence, as indigent defendants lack a right to obtain funding for
independent experts to conduct or review DNA testing. Moreo-
ver, most states do not routinely fund such assistance. 164 The
Court's ruling in Ake v. Oklahoma,165 however, provides a com-
pelling argument justifying provision of independent defense
experts. In Ake, the Court held that an insanity defense, where
made, is so critical to a case's outcome that without the provi-
sion of a defense expert psychiatrist, "the risk of an inaccurate
resolution of sanity issues is extremely high."1 66 Similarly,
DNA testing "dramatically enhance[s]" the accuracy of a jury's
determination. 6 7 Courts nevertheless routinely deny access to
independent forensic experts, risking inaccurate resolutions. 68
161. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
162. State v. Hicks, 536 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 549
N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1996).
163. Hicks, 549 N.W.2d at 436, 438, 444-45. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
also relied heavily on the fact that identity was critical to Hicks's conviction
and the State had used the same hair samples that exonerated him as affir-
mative evidence of his presence at the scene of the crime. Id. at 439.
164. See Jay A. Zollinger, Defense Access to State-Funded DNA Experts:
Considerations of Due Process, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1803, 1803-05 (1997) (describ-
ing state case law, and noting that the courts rely on a variety of grounds to
deny funds for defense DNA experts).
165. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
166. Id. at 82; Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert As-
sistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1340-
41(2004).
167. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
168. See Giannelli, supra note 166, at 1312; see also NAT'L RESEARCH
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Even without an independent expert, the defense could
cross-examine the law enforcement forensic expert regarding
their findings. This may not be an effective alternative, howev-
er, as states increasingly permit prosecutors to introduce DNA
test results at trial using only a laboratory certificate, thus
forestalling the opportunity to cross-examine the expert. 169
Courts permit this practice even though state forensic analysts
have mischaracterized forensic results in reports and testimo-
ny.170 Furthermore, prosecutors are not necessarily obligated to
provide the defense with laboratory notes underlying the report
stating the results. A good example of the potential injustice
arising from the combination of these factors is the case of Ar-
COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 87 (1996) (urging
that a second test performed by an independent expert is "[a] wrongly accused
person's best insurance against the possibility of being falsely incriminated").
At least two courts have held that if the prosecution seeks to introduce DNA
evidence at trial, then the defendant has a due process right to the appoint-
ment of a defense DNA expert. Dubose v. State, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1194, 1197-
98 (Ala. 1995); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 394 (Miss. 1992); see also Husske
v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 331, 345 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the
defendant was entitled to the assistance of a DNA expert at trial), vacated en
banc, 462 S.E.2d 120 (Va. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
Other courts have denied requests for DNA experts in cases where forensic
evidence is central at trial. The Michigan Supreme Court provides one recent
example, insisting on a greater factual nexus or a showing that the expert tes-
timony would have been helpful, where absent appointment of the expert and
analysis, no such showing can easily be made. People v. Tanner, 671 N.W.2d
728, 731 (Mich. 2003). The case is particularly odd in that the court reasoned
that the defense did not need an expert to independently evaluate the prosecu-
tion's forensic evidence, because some of that evidence excluded the defendant:
"DNA analysis not only eliminated the possibility that the blood on the vic-
tim's shirt belonged to either defendant or the victim, it established that the
blood belonged to an unidentified female." Id. Contrary to the court's reason-
ing, however, the DNA exclusion made the need for expert analysis greater,
where, as the dissent pointed out, the jury clearly did not understand the pow-
er of the DNA evidence that conclusively excluded the defendant. Rather, "the
jurors were told that only four percent of black women, women like [the] de-
fendant, match the blood sample found at the scene. This blood was the only
physical evidence placing defendant at the scene of the crime." Id. at 732
(Kelly, J., dissenting).
169. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV.
475, 478-91 (2006).
170. An example is the case of Dana Holland, in which the trial court re-
fused the defense an independent expert and the Chicago police crime lab ex-
pert Pamela Fish falsely told the court that insufficient material existed to
conduct DNA testing, which later exonerated Holland. See Bluhm Legal Clin-
ic, Northwestern School of Law, Meet the Exonerated, Dana Holland, http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/exonerations/
ilHollandSummary.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
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mando Villasana. At his 1999 criminal trial, the State gave the
defendant's lawyer only the laboratory report, which stated
that no semen evidence existed to be tested.17 1 However, a post-
conviction expert was able to obtain the underlying laboratory
notes, which disclosed the existence of other testable biological
evidence. This DNA evidence eventually led to his exonera-
tion. 172 Yet when Villasana filed a civil claim arguing that law
enforcement officials violated his rights by concealing this bio-
logical evidence at his criminal trial, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the officers had no Brady obligation to disclose the
laboratory notes.173
Further, if the State refuses to perform DNA testing, the
defendant may have little remedy available at trial, as the Su-
preme Court has held that "the police do not have a constitu-
tional duty to perform any particular tests."174 Given the lack of
a law enforcement duty, courts must then ensure that the de-
fense can perform any potentially probative tests in order to
ensure access to this critical evidence.
To prevent miscarriages of justice, our criminal procedure
rules should be understood to provide greater trial protection
regarding such highly probative forensic evidence. Ultimately,
the Brady duty should extend not just to disclosure of the exis-
tence of biological evidence and the results of any testing con-
ducted by the State, but also to require full reports and labora-
tory notes. 175 This in turn would permit far more meaningful
defense expert analysis and cross-examination, would encour-
age consideration of further forensic testing, and would assist
171. Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 977-78 (8th Cir. 2004).
172. See id. at 978.
173. Id. at 979 (holding that a forensic technician's notes underlying dis-
closed lab reports on DNA testing were not exculpatory, though they led the
defense to perform additional testing, because Brady applies only to evidence a
reasonable prosecutor would identify at the time as material).
174. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988).
175. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989) ("[Flair
trial and due process rights are implicated when data relied upon by a labora-
tory in performing tests are not available to the opposing party for review and
cross examination."); AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
DNA EVIDENCE 81 (3d ed. 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
standards/dnaevidence.pdf (proposing a requirement that "[t]he prosecutor
should be required ... to make available to the defense . .. laboratory re-
ports"); Paul C. Giannelli, Bench Notes & Lab Reports, CRIM. JUST., Summer
2007, at 50, 50-51.
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counsel in satisfying their obligations under Strickland.176 Si-
milarly, given the possible consequences for the client, the fail-
ure of counsel to pursue DNA testing should be carefully scru-
tinized at trial and during appeals. Absent such constitutional
protections, wrongful convictions will persist.
5. DNA Testing Denied or Unavailable at Trial
In the early years of DNA testing, five courts denied re-
quests for DNA testing that later exonerated defendants be-
cause the courts believed it was not relevant. 177 In retrospect,
such rulings appear misguided, since all trial courts now admit
DNA testing as reliable, relevant evidence. Nevertheless, as
DNA technology continues to evolve, one can imagine a future
court hesitating to grant a request for a test that employs new
and thus arguably unproven technologies. 178
None of the cases described above involved the situation in
which the State failed to collect or destroyed biological evi-
dence; such a failure would effectively prevent exoneration and
also inculpation of the actual perpetrator. However, many cases
that could utilize DNA testing do not do so because the relevant
biological evidence has been destroyed.179 In 1989, the Supreme
Court ruled that Larry Youngblood could not obtain relief be-
cause he could not show that police acted in bad faith in impro-
perly storing biological evidence, which degraded, from the vic-
tim of the rape of which he was convicted. 8 0 Currently, neither
negligent nor malicious destruction of biological evidence, nor
176. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1983) (imposing a
duty of "reasonably effective assistance" on criminal defense attorneys).
177. See supra tbl.1.
178. For example, Virginia currently limits requests under its post-
conviction DNA testing statute to testing by the Virginia Department of Fo-
rensic Sciences. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (Supp. 2007). That depart-
ment does not yet use Y-STR testing, and thus convicts have had requests for
such testing denied, though its use is accepted and has lead to exonerations.
See Frank Green, Two Va. Inmates Seek DNA Tests, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH
(Va.), Oct. 18. 2007, at B3 (describing the bar to obtaining Y-STR testing in
Virginia and noting that "[t]he Virginia Forensic Science Board agreed yester-
day to consider proposed legislation that would allow an accredited outside la-
boratory to perform the required DNA testing at the expense of the inmates").
179. See Miles Moffeit & Susan Greene, Foiled Justice, DENV. POST, July
24, 2007, at Al. The Denver Post found 141 cases where efforts to prove inno-
cence were frustrated by lost or destroyed evidence. See id.
180. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
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routine, post-trial disposal of evidence result in a sanction.18 1
Unsurprisingly, therefore, twenty exonerees unsuccessfully
raised destruction-of-exculpatory-evidence claims on appeal or
post-conviction.18 2 Each was later able to locate other evidence
that was fortuitously preserved and that could be subject to
DNA testing. One of those twenty was Youngblood, who was
exonerated in 2000 because more sophisticated DNA testing
produced a profile from the degraded evidence, which both ex-
cluded him and inculpated another individual. 8 3
Notwithstanding the Court's 1988 ruling that a defendant
must show bad faith in storing biological evidence in order to
establish a constitutional violation,18 4 the advent of DNA test-
ing has led to some legal change in the area of evidence preser-
vation, with twenty-two states passing statutes that require
the preservation of DNA evidence. However, violations of these
statutes are not generally sanctionable.18 5 Colorado's statute,
for example, states that it "does not create a duty to preserve
biological evidence nor does it create a liability on the part of a
law enforcement agency for failing to preserve biological evi-
dence."18 6
DNA testing creates more of a six-fold, rather than a
double, bind. A range of contradictory and incomplete criminal
procedure rules hinder access to DNA testing at trial, even
though it is potentially the most probative exculpatory evidence
available. Further, neither the states nor the federal courts
have adopted a straightforward right to preserve, disclose, and
accurately present evidence of innocence. Compounding the
problem, courts fail to ensure that defendants obtain the repre-
sentation and expert assistance at trial necessary to claim in-
nocence using DNA evidence. Such treatment sharply contrasts
181. See id.; California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984) (holding that
the defendant must demonstrate that the evidence "possess[ed] an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed").
182. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 96.
183. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Larry Youngblood, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/303.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
184. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
185. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 968.205 (2005-2006). Twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia require by statute preservation of biological evidence
from crime scenes. The Innocence Project, Preservation of Evidence Fact
Sheet, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/253.php (last vi-
sited Apr. 26, 2008).
186. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-414(3) (2007).
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with constitutional criminal procedure rules that regulate the
most probative evidence of earlier eras, such as eyewitness
identifications, confessions, and psychiatric testimony. 8 7 This
comparison demonstrates that constitutional criminal proce-
dure has unquestionably failed to fully adapt to the DNA era.
This failure helps explain why one-quarter of DNA exonera-
tions arose from DNA-era trials and why innocence claims will
likely persist in our criminal system. Thus, innocence claims
will continue to be subject to the contradictory rules governing
our complex system of criminal appeals and post-conviction re-
view, as discussed below.
C. STATE CRIMINAL APPEALS AND DNA STATUTES
Just as a dialectic between the federal and state systems
encouraged the creation of state post-conviction remedies in
every state, the lack of federal remedies for innocence claims
and the availability of new forms of evidence have encouraged
almost all states to develop post-conviction innocence sta-
tutes.188
1. Traditional Rules Governing New Evidence of Innocence
Though high percentages of those who received post-
conviction DNA testing have been exonerated,18 9 a range of
traditional rules has long hindered post-conviction discovery of
DNA evidence of innocence. First, state criminal appeals histor-
ically have not provided remedies permitting forensic testing. 190
Direct appeals traditionally have permitted motions regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. While such motions do
187. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03, 166.
188. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federal-
ism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046-52 (1977); James
Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, at
19-20 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 15, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=232712.
189. The Innocence Project reported a forty percent exoneration rate; simi-
larly, in Dallas County, Texas, thirteen of thirty-five cases in which the dis-
trict attorney conducted DNA testing since 2001 resulted in exonerations.
Scheck, supra note 105, at 601 ("Forty percent of the time, when we finally
find the evidence . . . the results come out in favor of the inmate."); see also
Ralph Blumenthal, For Dallas, New Prosecutor Means an End to the Old
Ways, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at N28.
190. See Holly Schaffter, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound
Gorilla in State Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 695, 704-06 (2002).
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not involve newly discovered evidence of innocence, they can
involve claims of innocence regarding the evidence introduced
at trial.1 9 '
Second, all states have long allowed new trial motions
brought either during the direct appeal or at the post-
conviction stage, including those brought on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence of innocence. Statutes or case law al-
lowing for such motions vary widely in their standards. Most
permit relief if new evidence of innocence is material or creates
a probability of a different outcome; 192 some do not specify a
standard except that relief may be granted if "the interest of
justice" so demands. 19 3 Others include detailed additional re-
quirements that the new evidence must not be cumulative19 4 or
must not have been available at the time of trial with due dili-
gence. 195 Some statutes and case law require more than mate-
riality: they require that no juror would have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt with the new evidence. 96 The state
statutes making available new trial motions based on newly
discovered evidence of innocence typically also contain statutes
of limitations, which states increasingly adopted beginning in
the 1970s; currently only twenty states do not have statutes of
limitations. 197 For those that do, the limitations period ranges
from a mere twenty-one days to three years, and motions aris-
191. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (setting the federal
standard for assessing sufficiency of the evidence, based on whether a reason-
able jury could have found guilt, with all inferences drawn in the state's fa-
vor).
192. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(g) (McKinney 2005).
193. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:20-1.
194. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2)(B) (2006).
195. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)(1).
196. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.11(A)(vii) (2004). For a survey of
state post-conviction standards regarding newly discovered evidence of inno-
cence, see David R. Dow et al., Is It Constitutional to Execute Someone Who Is
Innocent (and If It Isn't, How Can It Be Stopped Following House v. Bell?), 42
TULSA L. REV. 277, 293-321 (2006).
197. See 1 DONALD E. WILKES JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES &
RELIEF HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 1:6 (2007-2008 ed.). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the early development of these state new trial rules, see Daniel S.
Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 655, 666-86
(2005).
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ing from new evidence of innocence must be brought during the
pertinent limitations period. 198
State courts have denied post-conviction motions for DNA
testing and for post-testing relief, including those brought by
subsequently exonerated individuals, citing the expiration of
the statute of limitations period after which no motions based
on newly discovered evidence of innocence can be brought. 199 As
described in the context of cases where DNA technology existed
at the time of trial, a combination of reasons explain why DNA
evidence is often unavailable or not sought until years after a
conviction. In general, DNA testing is typically secured only
with great difficulty. Strikingly, most DNA exonerees managed
to obtain this testing only where law enforcement voluntarily
provided access.200 Indeed, most DNA exonerees did not receive
relief until long after DNA technology became available. Thus,
the first two hundred exonerees served an average of twelve
years before ultimately being exonerated. 20 1 For example, only
thirteen individuals had been exonerated by the end of 1993.202
However, only forty-two of two hundred individuals had been
exonerated by the end of 1997.203 Each year produces more
high-profile exonerations of actually innocent individuals, for
until just recently states did not provide access to post-
conviction DNA testing, and law enforcement did not always
consent to it. Dealing with this increasing embarrassment and
a lack of judicial remedies, governors often had to step in to
198. See 1 WILKES, supra note 197, § 1:6; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 410-11 (1993) (noting varying state statutes of limitations).
199. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1996) (denying DNA testing where the "appellant's conviction rests
largely on his own confession which contains details of the rapes which were
not available to the public"); Garrett, supra note 4, at 128.
200. In at least seventy-one out of two hundred exonerations (thirty-five
percent), the innocent appellant had to obtain a court order to gain access to
DNA testing. Garrett, supra note 4, at 119. At least 119 received access to
DNA testing through the consent of law enforcement or prosecutors. Id. I say
at least, because there was no information available in press reports concern-
ing how DNA testing was obtained for all two hundred DNA exonerees. Some
obtained DNA through more than one route. These categories cannot be sharp-
ly separated; for example, in some cases law enforcement agreed to testing but
only after a court order was imminent. See generally id. at 116-2 1.
201. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 200 EXONERATED, Too MANY WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/200/
ip_200.pdf.
202. Garrett, supra note 4, at 119 n.248.
203. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 201.
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grant pardons, which they did in at least twenty percent of the
first two hundred DNA exonerations. 20 4
2. Post-Conviction DNA Statutes
Responding to the increasing political pressure and the
lack of available remedies in the state or federal courts, states
began enacting statutes providing a right to post-conviction
DNA testing and a vacatur if the testing demonstrated inno-
cence, easing the traditional rules of finality that previously re-
stricted motions premised on new evidence of innocence. In
1999, ten years after the first post-conviction DNA exoneration,
only New York and Illinois had passed this type of DNA sta-
tute. 20 5 However, forty-four states and the District of Columbia
have since enacted such statutes, with most enacted in the past
five years. 20 6 Most of the remaining states are currently consi-
dering the adoption of such legislation.207
In addition to these efforts at the state level, the federal
Innocence Protection Act provides for post-conviction DNA test-
ing in federal criminal cases, 20 8 and a companion statute, the
204. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 120.
205. See Act of May 9, 1997, Pub. Act No. 90-0141, 1997 Ill. Laws 2461 (co-
dified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a) (2007)); Act of Oct. 18, 1999, ch. 560,
1999 N.Y. Laws 3247 (codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (McKin-
ney 2005)).
206. See infra app.
207. See infra app.; see also Kathy Swedlow, Don't Believe Everything You
Read: A Review of Modern "Post-Conviction" DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W.
L. REV. 355, 356-87 (2002) (providing an excellent review of the first twenty-
four innocence statutes and raising many of the concerns echoed here regard-
ing the current forty-four statutes). Oklahoma, on the other hand, had a sta-
tute, but it has expired. See infra app. See generally The Innocence Project,
National View, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/National-View.php (last
visited Apr. 26, 2008) (providing a state-by-state guide with links to statutes).
Five state courts have issued rulings recognizing a constitutional right to
claim innocence, but each state has now also passed a post-conviction DNA
testing statute. See Ex parte Lindley, 177 P.2d 918, 927 (Cal. 1947) (en banc);
Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Conn. 1994); People v. Wash-
ington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (Ill. 1996); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 103
S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); infra app. (listing states with DNA testing
laws).
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(g)(2) (Supp. IV 2006) ("The court shall grant the
motion of the applicant for a new trial or resentencing, as appropriate, if the
DNA test results, when considered with all other evidence in the case (regard-
less of whether such evidence was introduced at trial), establish by compelling
evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal .... ).
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Justice for All Act, provides financial incentives to the states to
make available post-conviction DNA testing.20 9 Seven states
currently lack a statutory right to post-conviction DNA test-
ing.210 Of those seven, two have had their state supreme courts
recognize a right to post-conviction DNA testing and relief
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence. 211 This leaves
five states, Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and
Oklahoma, in which post-conviction DNA testing is only avail-
able when law enforcement consents to testing or a federal
court grants it.212
This expansion of post-conviction options has been supple-
mented by the relaxation of rules of finality in all jurisdictions
but four. Of the five states lacking post-conviction DNA testing
statutes or judicial rights of access to testing, three-Alaska,
Alabama, and Massachusetts-excuse late post-conviction fil-
ings based on evidence of innocence, and a fourth, Oklahoma,
permits post-conviction filings based on newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence at any time.2 13 Two states, however, Dela-
ware and Idaho, which have DNA statutes, retain statutes of
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 14163a(b)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 2006). However, allocated
federal funds for post-conviction testing in states have not yet been spent. See
Richard Willing, Innocence Testing on Back Burner, USA TODAY, Oct. 11,
2007, at 1A.
210. The states that lack post-conviction DNA testing statutes are Ala-
bama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Mississippi, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
See The Innocence Project, supra note 207. Oklahoma had a statute that has
now lapsed. Supra note 207.
211. The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that DNA testing be con-
ducted post-conviction where it was likely to produce an acquittal. See Jenner
v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471-72 (S.D. 1999). The South Carolina Supreme
Court did the same. See State v. Spann, 513 S.E.2d 98, 99-100 (S.C. 1999).
212. For example, in Alabama, which lacks a DNA testing statute, De-
wayne Scott Cunningham lacked access to such testing under state law, and
was then denied access to DNA testing by a federal judge. See Brendan Kirby,
Judge Denies Prisoner's DNA Request, MOBILE PRESS-REG. (Ala.), Jan. 25,
2007, at 1A.
213. Alabama, Alaska, and Massachusetts permit motions for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence brought after the statute of
limitations expires, if they could not have been brought earlier. See ALA.
R. CRIM. P. 32.1(e); ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2) (2006); MASS. R. CRIM. P.
30. Wyoming's supreme court has suggested in dicta that evidence of inno-
cence would permit a court to consider an otherwise procedurally defaulted
claim. See Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Wyo. 1988). Oklahoma's
statute contains no statute of limitations. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1080(d)
(2001).
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limitations. 214 Thus, all jurisdictions, except Delaware, Idaho,
and Mississippi, now make exceptions to statutes of limitations
to permit motions based on new evidence of innocence to be
filed at any time. As a result of these developments, rules of fi-
nality have been substantially displaced.
Litigation under these innocence statutes is increasingly
common, 215 with at least twenty-one exonerees obtaining post-
conviction DNA testing pursuant to these state statutes. 216 This
avenue for relief marks a new development in post-conviction
law. No previously existing post-conviction remedies were ex-
clusively devoted to reviewing claims of innocence.
3. Restrictions on Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing
Although rules of finality have been supplanted nation-
wide, these statutory innocence claims retain other limitations,
evident in the often-arbitrary construction of these statutes,
which appear to focus more on curtailing relief than on con-
cerns of cost, finality, or accuracy. In other words, though
states have relaxed concern with finality, most have done so in
a manner that nevertheless precludes classes of convicts from
pursuing otherwise viable post-conviction DNA innocence
claims. In contrast to rules permitting DNA testing at or before
trial, most post-conviction statutes create procedural hurdles
that a petitioner must overcome before DNA testing can be ob-
tained. The Appendix depicts each restriction based on a review
of state post-conviction DNA procedures. 217
214. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-
4902(a) (2004).
215. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, DNA Evidence as New-
ly Discovered Evidence Which Will Warrant Grant of New Trial or Other Post-
conviction Relief in Criminal Case, 125 A.L.R.5TH 497 (2005) (collecting cases
in which courts ruled on new trial motions based on DNA evidence).
216. Thus, looking back at Figure 1 presenting a chart of exonerations over
time, these statutes do not explain the sharp rise in DNA exonerations that
began in the late 1990s, before most of these statutes took effect. For example,
Texas had its record number of five exonerations in 2000, the year before its
post-conviction testing statute was enacted. Rather, the explanation may be a
delayed reaction to the introduction of more sophisticated STR testing tech-
nology in the mid-1990s. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
217. The fairly current survey of these statutes can be found in 1 WILKES,
supra note 197, § 1:8.
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a. Outcome-Based Statutory Limitations
One way in which state innocence statutes sharply restrict
post-conviction access to DNA testing is by adopting outcome-
based tests that place courts in the position of predicting the
likely probative impact of the DNA testing. Currently, only
three states, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming, allow access to
testing on a showing that there is a likelihood that DNA could
be probative of innocence. 2 18 This standard certainly has validi-
ty since in cases where DNA testing could not possibly be prob-
ative of innocence, it should not be granted.
The vast majority of jurisdictions, thirty-eight of forty-five,
or eighty-four percent, however, require a threshold showing of
"materiality" before testing may be granted. Materiality re-
quires the petitioner to demonstrate that "a reasonable proba-
bility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing."2 19
This standard mirrors the Brady standard, under which mate-
riality is a requirement for obtaining a vacatur for a constitu-
tional violation.220 Thus, even if DNA could be probative of in-
nocence, no testing will be granted if the trial judge believes
insufficient evidence exists to satisfy the reasonable probability
standard.
Several states impose a still more onerous standard. Two
states, Colorado and Texas, require that it be "more probable
than not" that the DNA testing would prove innocence. 221
Moreover, two other states, New Hampshire and Virginia, re-
quire clear and convincing evidence of or a substantial showing
that testing would demonstrate innocence before a petitioner
can obtain DNA testing.222 Indeed, Virginia requires the peti-
218. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120(5)
(2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303 (effective July 1, 2008).
219. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
220. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ('We now hold that the suppression by the prose-
cution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
221. These states require petitioners to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that DNA testing will demonstrate their innocence. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-413 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (Ver-
non 2006).
222. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-D:2(III) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
327.1 (Supp. 2007).
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tioner to satisfy a battery of threshold showings, including pro-
viding clear and convincing evidence that the test results would
be materially relevant, may prove innocence, and would not be
cumulative or contradictory. One must also demonstrate that
the petitioner or counsel could not have sought testing earlier
through due diligence, and that the chain of custody of the
DNA is intact.223 Many of those exonerated by DNA testing
could never have satisfied such rigorous requirements, for only
through DNA testing were they able to uncover the evidence of
their innocence.
b. Judicial Interpretation of Outcome-Based Standards
Nevertheless, even a materiality or reasonable probability
requirement would not pose an insurmountable burden if it
were properly interpreted to simply require that the DNA test-
ing could be probative of innocence. However, state courts have
interpreted statutory threshold requirements very strictly.
South Dakota's supreme court, for example, cautioned that
DNA testing should only be granted under "extraordinary cir-
cumstances." 224 Furthermore, courts strictly interpret burdens
imposed by the statutes. Texas courts, for example, deny access
to DNA testing if the petitioner does not show by a "preponder-
ance" of the evidence that the testing will exculpate the peti-
tioner, or if a sworn affidavit does not describe innocence with
sufficient specificity. 225
Some courts sua sponte construct flimsy hypothetical sce-
narios and then hold that, if there exists even a possibility that
DNA testing might not exculpate, it should not be granted. For
instance, the lower and intermediate Texas courts denied DNA
223. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1.
224. See Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471-72 (S.D. 1999) ("Our sys-
tem of justice will hold little respect if its judgments are never final. Only in
extraordinary circumstances should a court allow post-conviction scientific
testing.").
225. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, No. 09-05-003 CR, 2006 WL 61937, at *3
(Tex. App. Jan. 11, 2006) (unpublished mem. opinion) (denying defendant's
motion requesting DNA testing because defendant's general assertions of in-
nocence in his affidavit were insufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that he would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had
been obtained through DNA testing). This is despite the fact that in revisions
to the statute, drafters made clear that "the Legislature did not intend for the
defendant to have to prove 'actual innocence' (a principle under habeas law) in
order to meet his burden to have the test done." House Criminal Jurispru-
dence Comm., Bill Analysis, H.B. 1011, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
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testing in the case of Billy James Smith, claiming that a rape
victim could have had sex with her boyfriend, and thus any
DNA testing results might not be exculpatory. 226 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed because it found that DNA
testing might have prevented his conviction.227 DNA testing
proved the defendant's innocence and Smith was released,
twenty years after he was first incarcerated. 228 In a series of
other cases, though, the Texas lower courts' denials of testing
have not been reversed, even when predicated on courts' asser-
tions that it would be conceivable for the results to merely
match the victim's partner. Such hypotheticals may lack sup-
port, but further DNA testing could refute them completely. In
these stranger-rape cases, by ordering elimination testing the
court could rule out the partner, and a DNA databank match
might locate another perpetrator, similarly making the DNA
test results dispositive of identity.2 29
Despite this, other courts have constructed similarly irre-
levant and refutable hypothetical scenarios. The Ohio Supreme
Court denied DNA testing in a sexual assault case where the
testing could have provided powerful evidence of innocence, ac-
cepting instead the prosecutor's argument that the testing
would not be "outcome determinative" should the test results
match the victim's then-boyfriend (though he could be elimi-
nated by further testing should the defendant be excluded).230
In an unusual window into the administration of a state's post-
conviction DNA testing program, aggregate data is available
226. See Smith v. State, No. 05-02-01411-CR, 2004 WL 213661, at *2 (Tex.
Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2004), rev'd, 165 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
227. See Smith, 165 S.W.3d at 364-65.
228. The Innocence Project, Profile: Billy James Smith, http://www
.innocenceproject.org/Content/264.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
229. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 183 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tex. App. 2006); Phil-
lips v. State, No. 05-04-00532-CR, 2005 WL 1819598, at *6 (Tex. App. Aug. 3,
2005).
230. See Phil Trexler, Court Denies DNA Test, AKRON BEACON J. (Ohio),
Apr. 12, 2007, at B5, available at 2007 WLNR 6950157. The Court of Appeals
of Ohio, Ninth District, found that the defendant did not show that DNA test-
ing would be outcome determinative. See State v. Wilkins, 839 N.E.2d 457,
464 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff'd, 863 N.E.2d 590 (Ohio 2007). The Ohio Su-
preme Court summarily affirmed. See Wilkins, 863 N.E.2d 590. On the other
hand, the Ohio Supreme Court also struck down as unconstitutional under
state law a provision that rendered unappealable a decision by a prosecutor
not to grant an inmate's request for post-conviction DNA testing. See State v.
Sterling, 864 N.E.2d 630, 635-36 (Ohio 2007).
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regarding DNA testing since Ohio's statute was revised in July
2003. Perhaps in part due to the reasoning adopted by the Ohio
courts, only nineteen applications have been granted although
315 prisoners have made applications for DNA testing. 231
c. Additional Restrictions on Access to DNA Testing
In contrast with states like Ohio and Texas, other states
like Illinois and New Jersey do not create such strained hypo-
theticals, nor do they evaluate the strength of the State's trial
case when determining whether to grant testing.23 2 Yet for al-
most all states, a range of other threshold restrictions apply.
For example, most statutes allow only post-conviction DNA
testing; only six states and the District of Columbia permit mo-
tions related to non-DNA forensic testing, scientific evidence, or
other new evidence of innocence. 233
All but three of the state post-conviction DNA testing sta-
tutes preclude entire categories of convicts who might other-
wise be able to prove their innocence from seeking DNA test-
ing. Only three states with such statutes, Hawaii, North
Carolina, and Wisconsin, permit all categories of convicts
access to DNA testing, although Connecticut merely limits re-
lief to those still incarcerated, Vermont provides access to a
fairly large list of felons, and Wyoming provides access to all fe-
lons. 234 Outside of these states-for reasons that mirror restric-
tions in traditional post-conviction law, but have little relev-
ance to the merits of a request for DNA testing-states prohibit
231. See Laura A. Bischoff & Tom Beyerlein, Evidence Preservation a Key
Piece to Exoneration Puzzle: Ohio's DNA Testing Law Also Closes Door to
Many Potential Applicants, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Ohio), Dec. 16, 2007, at A12.
The database regarding DNA petitions compiled by the Ohio Attorney Gener-
al's Office is on file with the author and is dated September 14, 2007.
232. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 799 N.E.2d 682, 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(ordering post-conviction DNA testing despite the fact that evidence against
defendant "was indeed overwhelming"); Bruner v. State, 88 P.3d 214, 217
(Kan. 2004) (holding it improper to deny statutory testing on the basis that the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming); State v. Peterson, 836 A.2d 821, 826
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that under the DNA testing statute,
"the strength of the evidence against a defendant is not a relevant factor in
determining whether his identity as the perpetrator was a significant issue").
233. Those jurisdictions are Arkansas (new scientific evidence), Washing-
ton, D.C., (new evidence of innocence), Idaho (includes other testing), Illinois
(includes other testing), Minnesota (other scientific evidence), New York (any
new evidence of innocence), and Virginia (any new scientific evidence).
234. See infra app.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.4 (2007).
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several classes of persons from requesting DNA testing. Aside
from limiting testing to those convicted of committing serious
crimes, the most prevalent restrictions include guilty plea ex-
clusions, custody requirements, due diligence requirements,
and requirements that the technology has changed since the
time of trial.
More specifically, twenty-five states limit DNA testing to
certain serious crimes, typically felonies, but sometimes violent
crimes; indeed, Kentucky and Nevada limit testing to capital
cases. 235 Additionally, twenty-one jurisdictions require that the
petitioner be incarcerated or in custody in order to obtain test-
ing.236 Moreover, only seventeen states provide for testing when
the petitioner seeks a sentence reduction, not relief from the
conviction, although another six states provide judges with the
discretion to grant testing in this circumstance. 237 Sixteen
states require that identity have been an issue at the criminal
trial. 238 These restrictive provisions may forestall relief in cases
where there was a guilty plea instead of a trial. Furthermore,
235. See infra app.
236. The jurisdictions are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. See infra app.
237. The states providing for testing when the petitioner seeks a sentence
reduction are Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. States that provide discretion are Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
238. The states are Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See infra app. In addition, Utah re-
quires that a theory of innocence be "not inconsistent with theories previously
asserted at trial." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(2)(c) (2002). The Iowa sta-
tute requires that identity "was a significant issue in the crime for which the
defendant was convicted." IOWA CODE § 81.10(7)(c) (2007). Delaware also re-
quires that identity must have been at issue in a criminal trial. See, e.g., An-
derson v. State, 831 A.2d 858, 865 (Del. 2003) (explaining that the state DNA
statute's identity-at-issue requirement is "relatively straightforward," where
"[ildentity is always an issue in a criminal trial unless the defendant admits
having engaged in the alleged criminal conduct and relies on a defense such as
consent or justification"). New York bars relief to guilty plea cases using dif-
ferent language. See People v. Byrdsong, 820 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div.
2006) (requiring conviction by verdict and judgment after trial in order to
qualify for post-conviction DNA testing under the New York statute); cf. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1405(e) (West Supp. 2008) (petition for testing may be heard by
judge who "conducted the trial, or accepted the convicted person's plea of
guilty or nolo contendre").
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they require that the defendant have disputed identity and
have claimed innocence at the trial, which might have been dif-
ficult to do credibly without the support of DNA evidence. 239
Nine exonerees pleaded guilty and many more did not dispute
identity at trial, which would have precluded any of them from
obtaining DNA testing under these statutes.240 Recognizing
this difficulty, seven states permit testing if identity "should"
have been an issue at trial, even if it was not raised. 241 Twelve
states require that the requested testing have been technologi-
cally impossible at the trial.242 Yet few states recognize the
need for DNA testing on the sole basis that the constantly in-
creasing size of DNA databanks establishes cold hits with ac-
tual perpetrators. 243
A smaller number of states have adopted a range of addi-
tional and significant restrictions. Five states require that mo-
tions be brought within one to three years after the conviction,
though only Delaware and Idaho retain statutes of limitations;
the three other states create various good-cause exceptions. 244
239. See Weeks v. State, 140 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (noting, in
interpreting the state's DNA statute to apply to such cases, that "[a] person
who pleaded guilty is not somehow 'more' guilty, or less deserving of a chance
to show actual innocence, than one who went to trial").
240. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 123, 171 (stating that nine exonerees
pleaded guilty and that DNA testing can only be used to show identity when
biological evidence is left at the crime scene, which is not the case in the "vast
majority" of criminal cases).
241. The states are California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Montana, New
Hampshire, and West Virginia.
242. The states are Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See infra
app. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, however, only require new
technology where the biological evidence was not newly discovered. Thus, the
requirement functions as a due diligence requirement. Maine requires new
technology as a reason to excuse failure to file within two years of conviction.
Other states, such as Nebraska, New Hampshire, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin, impose a new technology requirement for successive testing.
243. A New Jersey court recognized this in State v. DeMarco, 904 A.2d 797,
807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), which granted post-conviction DNA test-
ing under the New Jersey statute, on the ground that "[t]echnological ad-
vances since defendant's conviction have enabled the production of DNA typ-
ing data, which could be run through the CoDIS system and potentially
implicate another suspect."
244. The states are Arkansas (rebuttable presumption of no timeliness af-
ter three years, though courts may excuse later applications for "good cause"
or newly discovered evidence); Delaware (three years); Idaho (one year); Maine
(two years after September 1, 2008, or time of conviction, or two years after
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Four additional states have determined that attorney er-
ror, including failure to request DNA testing at the trial stage
or to exercise due diligence, does not merit post-conviction DNA
testing.245 Yet, as discussed above, several exonerees had inef-
fective lawyers who neglected to request DNA testing. 246 Not-
withstanding the ongoing exonerations of DNA-era convicts,
four states included sunset provisions under which the statute
ceases to operate by a certain year,247 and one state, Michigan,
permits relief only to people convicted before 2001. Only a few
states have considered what additional testing should be per-
mitted when initial results are inconclusive, when new technol-
ogical advancements occur, and when new biological evidence is
discovered. And only twenty-four states provide counsel to
represent petitioners during the complex process of negotiating
these procedural hurdles. 248 While these statutes vary widely in
procedural restrictions, all state statutes share the require-
ment that the application be made to the trial court that pre-
sided over the conviction.
4. Restrictions on Post-DNA Exclusion Relief
That long list of state limitations is only at the threshold.
Even after DNA testing performed excludes an individual, sev-
eral states impose additional limitations. New York permits re-
lief if the DNA shows a reasonable probability of innocence,
while Pennsylvania uses the heightened more-probable-than-
not standard.249 Even more onerous, seven states require that
the DNA provide substantial or clear and convincing evidence
of innocence in order to justify a vacatur. 250 Offering no guid-
new technology available); and Minnesota (two years after conviction, unless
there is newly discovered evidence that due diligence at the time of trial and
within the two-year time period could not have ascertained).
245. The states are Minnesota (due diligence excuses two-year time limit),
Missouri, Pennsylvania (listing permissible reasons for not having requested
DNA testing at trial), and Virginia.
246. See supra Part II.C.4.
247. Florida repealed its sunset provision. States that still retain them are
Louisiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
248. Cf. Garrett, supra note 4, at 168 (finding that many states have long
provided inadequate indigent defense funding).
249. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney 2005); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543 (West 2007).
250. The states are Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Utah, and
Virginia. See infra app.
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ance or limitations, the remaining states, explicitly or implicit-
ly, grant the trial judge discretion in deciding whether to grant
relief based on post-conviction DNA testing.251
As in the context of access to DNA testing, courts address-
ing the effect on relief of such testing have often constructed
hypothetical scenarios unrelated to any evidence presented at
the original trial in order to deny relief, even after DNA testing
excludes the appellant. Perhaps the most notorious example is
Texas Court of Appeals Judge Sharon Keller's explanation to
Frontline reporters in support of her decision to deny relief to
Roy Criner, even though DNA testing excluded him. Keller es-
sentially told the reporters that DNA testing could never suffi-
ciently prove innocence because a scenario could always be con-
structed to explain away the results. She felt that the DNA
evidence would not have "made a difference in the verdict" in
Criner's case because the sixteen-year-old victim could have
been "promiscuous" in the days before her rape-murder, al-
though this allegation of promiscuity was not based on the trial
record or any other evidence. 252 It was only after a cigarette
butt confirmed that the semen donor was present at the crime
scene that Criner was pardoned. 253 Eschewing hypotheticals,
other courts have simply discounted the evidence of innocence
to reach similar results. For example, courts frequently rely
upon equivocal evidence presented at trial and discount DNA
evidence as merely cumulative or nonprobative. 254 Such rulings
are perhaps unsurprising where the statutes provide little
guidance as to what standard to employ when deciding whether
to grant relief based on a DNA exclusion.
251. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(b)-(c) (1995 & Supp. 2007).
252. See Interview by Frontline: The Case for Innocence with Judge Sharon
Keller, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (Public Broadcasting Corporation
2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/
interviews/keller.html.
253. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence, Four Cases: Roy Criner, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/cases (last visited Apr. 26,
2008).
254. See, e.g., Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(stating that the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-
conviction relief, finding that DNA results exonerating Jerry Watkins only
"suggest the possibility" of another perpetrator and that the DNA evidence
was merely "cumulative" of inconclusive serology evidence at trial); People v.
McSherry, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 630, 636 (Ct. App. 1992) (depublished) (failing to
vacate conviction despite DNA exclusion, citing to serology results and the vic-
tim's identification).
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Unquestionably, some cases do not deserve DNA testing.
Yet the myriad threshold limitations and onerous standards
ensure that most courts can deny access to DNA testing that
could provide a powerful showing of innocence, and deny relief
following highly exculpatory DNA results. Many of the statutes
reflect a traditional reluctance to reopen a criminal case, even
in the face of powerful DNA evidence of innocence. Those sta-
tutes appear to provide mere window-dressing for post-
conviction systems determined to deny access to proof of inno-
cence and to deny relief to meritorious claims of innocence.
These concerns might prompt some states to amend their sta-
tutes, thereby creating another generation of post-conviction
DNA statutes that will finally provide unobstructed avenues
for relief to the actually innocent. 255 Leaving to legislators the
question whether actually innocent individuals may obtain
access to evidence of their innocence, and then relief, has per-
haps predictably resulted in a patchwork of approaches that
continue to create barriers to those who could prove innocence.
The following Sections examine whether and how claims of in-
nocence create constitutional questions that entitle an individ-
ual to innocence-based relief in the absence of any state law
remedy.
D. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: RESISTANCE AND INNOCENCE
Traditionally, habeas corpus review provided a conduit for
procedural constitutional claims pertaining to a criminal trial's
fundamental fairness, but not the defendant's possible inno-
cence. 256 Even today, the vast majority of federal criminal ap-
peals involve constitutional claims related to the integrity of
the criminal trial, such as those alleging ineffective assistance
255. For example, New York is considering legislation to broaden access to
post-conviction DNA testing, together with other forensic science reforms. See,
e.g., A.08047, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (amending section 440.30 of
the Criminal Procedure Law to clarify that post-conviction testing may be or-
dered whether a case was resolved by jury trial or otherwise).
256. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006); Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1993) (noting that federal habeas typically
involves procedural and not substantive review of convictions); William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
447 (1995) (arguing that the "current law of criminal procedure is indeed
about procedure," but also that the origins of such cases lie in substantive
questions about what government can criminalize).
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of counsel,257 Brady violations, equal protection violations, and
procedural violations. 258 Additional procedural rights call for a
reversal of a conviction if the trial court failed to exclude unre-
liable evidence. 259 While many of these protections "promote
the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the inno-
cent go free," they "are granted to the innocent and the guilty
alike." 260 Federal courts rarely conduct purely substantive
criminal review, and when they do, it is typically to examine
the constitutionality of a criminal prohibition's scope as applied
to the convict's conduct. 261
Although the traditional focus of habeas corpus review has
been on procedural fairness, petitioners now assert claims of
actual innocence in far higher percentages of habeas filings. 262
Such an increase has developed even though the Court has
failed to determine "whether federal courts may entertain con-
vincing claims of actual innocence." 263 Federal courts rarely
257. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
258. See VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 45-59 (1994).
259. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 105 (finding that while few exonerees ob-
tained any relief on any claims, "the subset who did receive reversals most of-
ten received reversals on claims regarding seriously erroneous or unreliable
factual evidence at their trials").
260. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1986) (quoting
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985)). Such constitutional claims each re-
quire the fault of a government actor, judge, defense attorney, prosecutor, or
police. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
261. For examples of substantive review, the Court recently limited the
class of those eligible for death sentences. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of individuals who were juveniles at the time of the offense); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (ruling that the execution of mentally re-
tarded felons violates the Eighth Amendment).
262. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITI-
GATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2007), available at http://law.vanderbilt
.edu/article-searcharticle-detail/download.aspx?id=1639 (finding that, in a
study of sampled habeas filings from 2000-2005, 3.9% of noncapital petition-
ers raised newly discovered evidence of innocence claims, as did 10.8% of capi-
tal petitioners, and that 18.9% raised sufficiency of the evidence claims). A
quick survey of citations to the two Supreme Court cases discussing innocence-
related rights, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390 (1993), indicate a large increase in reliance on those decisions. Fed-
eral habeas petitions citing to Schlup increased from 111 in 1996 to 773 cites
in 2006, and citations to Herrera rose from 40 cites in 2000, to 267 in 2006.
These figures were generated by a search conducted using the Westlaw "all-
feds" database for cases citing either Schlup or Herrera.
263. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427.
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conduct factual review of claims asserted in habeas petitions.
The federal habeas corpus statute prohibits evidentiary hear-
ings for the development of new factual evidence except in nar-
row circumstances, which if met, still permit a discretionary
decision by the judge whether to hold a hearing; habeas discov-
ery is also discretionary.264 Thus, federal courts have long been
unlikely places for development of innocence claims, helping to
explain why only two of the first two hundred post-conviction
DNA exonerees obtained DNA testing during habeas corpus
proceedings. 265 Federal courts can, however, provide access to
DNA testing; several circuits have done so via § 1983 actions.266
The Section that follows describes six tests that the Su-
preme Court has adopted to assess innocence and guilt post-
conviction, and shows how these complex, nuanced standards of
review operate. The Section also shows how these standards ul-
timately do not provide any independent grounds for relief to
the actually innocent. In the subsequent Section, therefore, I
discuss how federal courts can shift their focus towards an ap-
proach that reviews claims of innocence.
1. The Federal Framework for Substantive Review
The Court has adopted six central tests in post-conviction
law, and each uses a slightly different formulation of guilt or
innocence in determining whether to grant relief. In Justice
Antonin Scalia's words, these tests create "ineffable gradations
of probability.. . beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any
mind) to grasp."267 Whatever the gradation, none provides a
ground for relief to the actually innocent; instead, various rules
permit exceptions to procedural obstacles based on showings of
264. Federal courts hold hearings in only approximately one percent of ha-
beas filings. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FED. COURTS STUDY
COMM., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES 468-515 (1990) (finding hearings granted for
1.1% of petitions); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2554(e)-(f) (2000).
265. Of the sixty exonerees who had a court order access to DNA testing,
only two had federal courts grant DNA testing. See Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d
693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996); Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's
Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Only nine of the two hundred
had a court remand for an evidentiary hearing at any level in their appeals.
See Garrett, supra note 4, at 105.
266. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
267. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86 (2004) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring) (describing the Chapman, Brecht, Agurs, and Strickland
standards).
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innocence, or they deny relief for claims based on evidence of
guilt.
First, harmless error tests epitomize the current post-
conviction focus on guilt. Applicable during habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, the Brecht v. Abrahamson test provides that, in cases
where the petitioner suffered a constitutional violation, courts
can deny relief if the State can show, based on the totality of
the evidence introduced at trial-including the evidence of the
petitioner's guilt-that the error did not substantially contri-
bute to the conviction.268
Second, multiple constitutional claims incorporate a guilt-
based harmless error rule, with the most notable being the
Brady right to material exculpatory evidence, 269 and the Strick-
land ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 270 Vindication
of both of these rights requires a demonstration of prejudice.27 1
The Court has rejected an outcome-determinative standard, but
has required the appellant to demonstrate a reasonable proba-
bility that the error contributed to the trial outcome. 272 More-
over, the Court has encouraged lower courts to evaluate the
prejudice prong first and thus avoid reaching the question of
the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.273 A range of other due
268. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638-39 (1993). The Supreme
Court has cautioned lower courts not to conduct a hypothetical inquiry asking
whether the petitioner would still be convicted based on evidence untainted by
constitutional error. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) ("The
inquiry ... is ... whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a
guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the
findings to support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guaran-
tee."). Nevertheless, lower courts persist in conducting harmless error analys-
es in that guilt-based fashion. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 107-10; see also
Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activism:
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1354 (1994); Ams-
terdam, supra note 17, at 52 ("One reason why the standard gets watered
down in practice is that harmless error analysis is seldom written up in appel-
late opinions in a way that forces the authoring judge, or his or her concurring
colleagues, or anybody else, to examine it critically.").
269. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
270. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
271. See id. at 687; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
272. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94 (holding that the petitioner must
show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
273. See id. at 697 ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that
course should be followed.").
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process rights also incorporates a prejudice element, and feder-
al courts require that a petitioner show both "cause" and "pre-
judice" before a court will excuse the procedural default of a
claim. 274
Third, under the Court's ruling in Schlup, federal courts
consider evidence of actual innocence under a more-likely-than-
not standard, 275 which is an outcome-determinative test more
stringent than the prejudice inquiry. Despite requiring a heigh-
tened showing of innocence that is sufficient to prevail on an
independent constitutional claim, Schlup provides no indepen-
dent innocence claim. As in House, if a court finds sufficient
evidence of innocence, it may only excuse a procedural default
so as to proceed to the merits of the otherwise defaulted consti-
tutional claim. 276 Nevertheless, the Schiup standard permits
courts to excuse procedural default of constitutional claims in
cases involving new evidence of innocence. 277 As developed be-
low, cases involving substantial evidence of innocence may tend
to earn relief on underlying constitutional violations. Hence,
the innocence gateway provides an important remedy, particu-
larly as the Court developed it in House in the context of DNA
evidence. 278
Fourth, Jackson v. Virginia claims permit relief if the evi-
dence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prose-
cution, was so insufficient that no reasonable juror could vote
to convict. 279 Such claims almost never earn relief given that
the "no reasonable juror could"280 standard is more stringent
than the more-likely-than-not Schlup standard. 281
Fifth, the habeas corpus statutes, as amended by the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),282 impose
274. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
275. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326 (1995).
276. See id. at 316-17.
277. See id. at 331-32.
278. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077-87 (2006).
279. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ("[Tlhe relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").
280. See id.
281. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
282. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22,
28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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substantial limits on the ability of federal courts to hear new
evidence of innocence. 283 The AEDPA imposes a one-year sta-
tute of limitations that is triggered not only when the state di-
rect appeal ends, but also on "the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been dis-
covered through the exercise of due diligence," whichever is lat-
er.284 If new evidence of innocence surfaces, the defense exer-
cised due diligence, and the new evidence of innocence provides
the "factual predicate" of the claim, then a habeas petition may
be pursued later than would otherwise be possible. 285 The peti-
tion will be dismissed if the petitioner, exercising due diligence,
should have presented the new evidence earlier, or if the evi-
dence does not provide a factual predicate for any procedurally
preserved constitutional claim. 286
A hypothetical example helps explain the operation of this
rule. Paul House's habeas petition was his first,287 but suppose
that he had already filed a petition prior to uncovering new
evidence of innocence. In this scenario, House would have then
encountered substantial statutory obstacles. The AEDPA bars
refiling any claim previously brought in a federal habeas corpus
application, even if the new evidence provides substantial addi-
tional support for the claim. 28 8
The AEDPA also restricts the ability to file a second or suc-
cessive petition with a new, previously unasserted claim. 289 To
bring a new claim in a second or successive petition, the statute
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
284. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
285. See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 372-74 (6th Cir. 2007) (tolling
the statute of limitations based on new evidence of forensic fraud); see also 1
RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5.2b n.45 (5th ed. 2005).
286. The Sixth Circuit has equitably tolled the AEDPA statute of limita-
tions on the grounds of actual innocence, and additional federal courts have
suggested that equitable tolling could excuse late filing given a sufficient
showing of innocence. See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 602 (6th Cir. 2005)
("[Wihere an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner can demonstrate that it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through
the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying constitutional claims.");
Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Equitable tolling would
be appropriate, for example, when a prisoner is actually innocent .. .
287. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2075 (2006).
288. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
289. See id. § 2244(b)(2).
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requires that the petitioner must seek relief on the rare, new
constitutional rule that the Supreme Court has "made retroac-
tive" during collateral appeals. 290 Alternatively, the petitioner
may demonstrate the existence of new evidence that could not
have been previously discovered with "due diligence," and that
provides "clear and convincing evidence" such that "no reason-
able factfinder" would find guilt were this evidence known. 291 If
a petitioner failed to exercise diligence in developing facts in
the state courts, the AEDPA requires that the habeas petition-
er meet an elevated showing of innocence to obtain a federal
evidentiary hearing.292 Demonstrating that no reasonable fact-
finder would find guilt were this evidence of innocence known
is certainly more difficult to accomplish without the benefit of
the evidentiary hearing sought precisely to explore that evi-
dence. Taken collectively, these procedural restrictions sharply
limit the ability of federal courts to consider new evidence of
innocence, particularly because such evidence often surfaces
years after a trial.293
290. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
291. Id. § 2254(e)(2) (2000); see also id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that a
petitioner filing a second claim must show that "the factual predicate for the
claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due
diligence"); id. (noting that a petitioner must "establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense").
292. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (stating that the granting of an evidentiary
hearing is barred where the petitioner "failed to develop" the factual predicate
for a claim, unless the petitioner can show both reliance on a new rule "made
retroactive" or "a factual predicate that could not have been previously discov-
ered through the exercise of due diligence," and that "the facts underlying the
claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the ap-
plicant guilty of the underlying offense"). The Supreme Court interpreted
what it means for a petitioner to "fail[] to develop" facts within the meaning of
§ 2254(e)(2) and ruled that the court may grant a hearing where counsel exer-
cised diligence during state proceedings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,
430, 440 (2000).
293. A few habeas petitions have satisfied that standard. See, e.g., Cooper
v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2004) (permitting a second ha-
beas petition based on new evidence of innocence and ordering mitochondrial
DNA testing). But see Parker v. Sirmons, No. 07-6021, 2007 WL 1652612, at
*2 (10th Cir. June 8, 2007) (finding that the new evidence did not satisfy the
materiality standard for the underlying constitutional claim and, thus, would
not satisfy the statutory standard); Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333, 337 (5th
Cir. 2002) (finding that the new evidence did not satisfy the statutory stan-
dard).
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Sixth, the only freestanding claim of innocence in our fed-
eral system remains hypothetical under the Court's divided de-
cision in Herrera. The Court stated hypothetically that a person
facing execution might be entitled to constitutional relief if they
could persuasively show innocence in a way that satisfied an
unstated but "extraordinarily high" burden.2 94 Only Justice
Harry Blackmun, joined by two other Justices, suggested a
lower, "probably actually innocent" standard for showing inno-
cence. 295 Five Justices stated separately that a freestanding in-
nocence claim should exist, and as Justice Scalia predicted, the
result was "a strange regime that assumes permanently,
though only 'arguendo,' that a constitutional right exists, and
expends substantial judicial resources on that assumption."296
However, given Herrera's extraordinarily high burden, every
claim for relief brought under Herrera has been ultimately
dismissed.29 7
With Herrera's result preserving a mirage of an innocence
claim bearing a standard that no one has satisfied, the five es-
tablished innocence-related inquiries offer only gestures toward
innocence with procedural "gateways." It should be no surprise,
then, that not one person exonerated by post-conviction DNA
294. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Prior decisions had
used the word "extraordinary" to refer to the required showing of prejudice, or
reasonable probability of innocence. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
494-95 (1991).
295. Justice Blackmun phrased his standard as requiring a showing that
the petitioner "is probably actually innocent." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 444
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 429 (Scalia, J., concurring).
297. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 126 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding
that the Herrera standard was not met), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 890 (2008).
The only exceptions were in a few cases, including House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct.
2064 (2006), where a court initially granted relief on an innocence claim but
then was reversed. See Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence:
The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 130-36 (2005) (re-
viewing lower court decisions relying on Herrera and finding fifty-four in
which the court assumed a bare innocence claim was cognizable, but denied
relief). Commenting on this state of affairs, Anthony Amsterdam writes that
courts
either refuse to recognize that there is any Due Process or other con-
stitutional right to redress for a claim of mere innocence or they set
the standard for relief so high that it cannot be met by anything short
of divine revelation manifested by the physical appearance of God in
the courtroom, bearing a habeas petition for the convicted defendant
in his right hand and a confession by the true perp in his left.
Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 53.
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testing prevailed on an actual innocence claim during their ap-
peals prior to obtaining DNA testing. 298 Courts denied Herrera
relief to five people who we now know were actually inno-
cent,299 including one, Darryl Hunt, who presented to the
Fourth Circuit initial DNA test results that excluded him.
300
Following a decades-long campaign to restrict habeas review by
emphasizing guilt-based restrictions on habeas relief and inno-
cence-based gateways, innocence remains as irrelevant as
Judge Friendly suggested in 1970.301
2. Innocence and Post-Conviction Review
The adoption of a federal constitutional innocence claim
would provide uniformity and ensure an avenue of relief in the
states that do not yet provide for meaningful adjudication of
innocence claims. Such a solution, sensible as it may be, does
not appear imminent given that the Court recently dodged the
issue again in House. Despite the Court's inaction, federal
courts could take several approaches other than through the
use of freestanding innocence claims. I discuss below the way
that innocence changes the analysis for a range of constitution-
al criminal procedure claims. Indeed, federal courts have al-
ready begun to play an unappreciated role as a backstop to
guard against wrongful convictions in situations where new
evidence of innocence alters (1) discovery provided during ha-
beas proceedings; (2) the merits analysis for constitutional
criminal procedure claims; and (3) the harmless error analysis
for constitutional claims.
a. Post-Conviction Discovery
Without considering the merits of any freestanding inno-
cence claim, courts may develop innocence claims factually by
providing access to evidence of innocence during discovery. A
series of federal courts already do this by entertaining § 1983
petitions for DNA testing;302 other federal courts grant access
298. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 97 n.157.
299. See id. at 96 tbl.5.
300. The panel found the DNA evidence "simply not sufficiently exculpato-
ry to warrant a new trial." Hunt v. McDade, No. 98-6808, 2000 WL 219755, at
*3 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000).
301. See Friendly, supra note 1, at 145.
302. See, e.g., Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229 (D. Mass. 2006).
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to testing as part of discovery during habeas review. 303 For ex-
ample, evidence of innocence is relevant discovery to a Schlup
inquiry or to a Brady theory, is related to substantive inquiries
under a range of criminal procedure rights, and affects preju-
dice and harmless error analyses.304 Therefore, in situations
where state courts do not afford post-conviction discovery of
evidence of innocence, federal courts provide an important
backstop by providing discovery, even though they currently
cannot grant relief on a freestanding innocence claim.30 5 Even
without an innocence claim, the federal courts' willingness to
factually develop innocence claims may place pressure on
states to provide access to DNA testing and other exculpatory
evidence at the post-conviction stage, and then to review claims
of innocence based on that evidence.
b. Innocence and Constitutional Criminal Procedure
In the absence of any separate freestanding innocence
claim, new evidence of innocence affects the substantive in-
quiry for underlying criminal procedure rights. Innocence plays
an important role in precisely those constitutional criminal
303. See Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 06-35875, 2008 WL 861890,
at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2008) ("[Defendant] has a limited due process right of
access to the evidence for purposes of post-conviction DNA testing, which
might either confirm his guilt or provide strong evidence upon which he may
seek post-conviction relief."); McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir.
2007) (joining the "Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and district courts
in the First and Third Circuits," in holding that "a claim seeking post-
conviction access to evidence for DNA testing may properly be brought as a
§ 1983 suit," and rejecting the contrary views of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1218 (2008). Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases provides for discovery in habeas proceedings if the peti-
tioner shows "good cause." R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 6(a), reprinted in 28
U.S.C. § 2254 cmt. (2000). For a case granting such testing, see Drake v. Por-
tuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir. 2003).
304. See supra Part II.D.1. Such relief is limited by the narrow innocence-
based exception to the successive petition rule and the narrow innocence-
based exception to the AEDPA's statute of limitations discussed above. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000). Those limits are not insurmountable, however, given
the relevance of new evidence of innocence to the merits analyses for a number
of central criminal procedure claims. See infra Part II.D.2.b.
305. For example, Larry Peterson, exonerated by post-conviction DNA test-
ing, filed a § 1983 action in federal court seeking testing. See State v. Peter-
son, 836 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). The action was stayed so
that he could pursue statutory testing that was denied in the lower state court
but then provided by the appellate court, perhaps in part due to the pending
§ 1983 action. See id. at 823.
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procedure contexts in which the Supreme Court has incorpo-
rated guilt-based inquiries into the merits analysis to permit
relief for a violation. As in civil wrongful conviction suits, the
consequence is that DNA evidence can render irrelevant such
harmless error rules-under which a court would excuse a con-
stitutional violation if presented with trial evidence of guilt-
and also dramatically undermine constitutional presumptions
of the reliability of trial evidence. 30 6 Evidence of innocence may
affect a court's ruling regarding the reliability of evidence at
trial, which may in turn relate to its assessment of the merits
of the constitutional violation or a prejudice inquiry.
For example, a common claim brought by petitioners in
which new evidence of innocence supports relief is a Brady
claim. In its most straightforward form, Brady prohibits the
withholding from defense counsel of material exculpatory evi-
dence. 30 7 Some courts have also held that Brady creates an on-
going duty for the State to disclose new evidence of innocence,
such as newly available DNA testing, even after trial.308
Still other constitutional claims require a petitioner to
show that a state actor undermined the fairness of the trial.309
However, as noted above, several rights also relate to the relia-
bility or accuracy of trial evidence. 3 10 In these cases, evidence of
innocence may supplement existing evidence regarding State
misconduct, thus bolstering the constitutional showing that the
State acted so as to produce an inaccurate result. 31 1 Most cases
involving post-conviction DNA testing also involved an
eyewitness identification. 3 12 Prior to obtaining this DNA test-
ing, none of the exonerees had any success arguing that an
eyewitness identification was unconstitutionally suggestive
and unreliable 3 13 under the factors set forth in Neil v. Big-
306. Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 62-69 (arguing that harmless
error rules do not apply in civil wrongful conviction actions brought post-
exoneration).
307. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
308. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425-26 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (remanding for DNA testing).
309. See, e.g., Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the
Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1676 (1996).
310. See supra Part II.D.1.
311. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 109-10.
312. Id. at 73.
313. Id. at 104.
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gers,314 and adopted by the Court in Manson v. Brathwaite.31 5
For example, the court ruled against Carlos Lavernia in a case
where the victim testified at trial, in reference to the photo
lineup, "'That was the man, it was that easy. I'm absolutely
positive,"' because "Lavernia ha[d] not alleged any factor that
would have made the photo lineups impermissibly suggestive,
nor [was] any apparent in the trial court record." 316 However,
DNA evidence of innocence may tend to buttress a claim that
the eyewitness was mistaken, and therefore unreliable under
the Manson test.317
Similarly, evidence of innocence may bolster a claim that a
confession was coerced, on the theory that an innocent person
would be less likely to confess absent law enforcement pres-
sure. In addition, because DNA evidence often shows that fo-
rensic expert testimony or other testimony at trial was unrelia-
ble,318 it may support a constitutional claim that evidence
presented at trial was fabricated. A due process fabrication
claim requires a showing that the State knowingly presented
false evidence to the jury.319 However, evidence of innocence
can help show that evidence at trial was unreliable or false. 320
Additionally, new evidence of innocence alters the analysis
for the guilt-based prejudice analysis, the second prong of the
standard for several constitutional criminal procedure
claims. 321 As the Court explained in Strickland, "a verdict or
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely
to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming
314. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
315. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
316. See Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1988).
317. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (concluding that "reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony").
318. Cf. id. (discussing the reliability of DNA evidence).
319. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
320. An example is the case of Anthony Hicks. Hicks did not assert a fabri-
cation claim, but the state court granted Hicks a new trial, finding that, based
on the DNA test results, the jury would have questioned "the accuracy of the
[victim's] identification." State v. Hicks, 549 N.W.2d 435, 444 (Wis. 1996). In
addition, though the prosecution expert testified that hairs found at the scene
were consistent with Hicks, "[t]he DNA test result, in conjunction with [the
victim's] testimony about the source of the Negro hairs in her apartment, dis-
credit[ed] one of the pivotal pieces of evidence forming the foundation of the
State's case." Id.
321. See supra Part II.D.1.
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record support."322 Thus, new evidence of innocence may un-
dermine the reliability of the guilty verdict at trial, making a
court less likely to hold that there was not a reasonable proba-
bility that a constitutional violation affected the outcome.
Courts already consider the strength of the prosecution's case
when assessing whether a constitutional violation affected the
outcome. 323 Consequently, when DNA evidence of innocence se-
verely undermines that case, the prejudice from the constitu-
tional violation is correspondingly enhanced.
Thus, federal courts have explicitly considered evidence of
innocence when conducting prejudice analyses in rulings re-
garding individuals exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing.
For example, in the case of DNA exoneree Stephen Toney, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that DNA testing would be relevant
"[i]n order to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffective assis-
tance claim." 324 Similarly, the court emphasized preliminary
DNA results in awarding Jerry Watkins relief on a Brady claim
regarding suppressed police reports that supported a theory of
third-party guilt. 325 The court stated that "[w]hen the court also
takes into account the DNA evidence" the "clear conclusion
[that there was prejudice] becomes even stronger."326 Likewise,
in the case of Anthony Hicks, the only DNA exoneree to receive
a reversal on a Strickland claim on the basis of his lawyer's
failure to request DNA testing, the court emphasized that there
was prejudice because the post-conviction DNA testing showed
that the State's hair evidence was false. 327 The handful of fed-
eral courts that have denied discovery requests for DNA testing
322. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
323. See Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Crimi-
nal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 752, 768-69 (1980).
324. Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996). Efforts to use dis-
covery to uncover wrongful convictions may also complement aggregative ap-
proaches that I have discussed elsewhere, where courts or administrative bo-
dies such as innocence commissions review groups of cases raising indicia of
innocence. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 383, 435-46 (2007).
325. See Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 856 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
326. See id. at 847. "This court is considering the DNA evidence as it ap-
plies to Watkins' claims of actual innocence and cause and prejudice to excuse
his failure to present his Brady claims and other constitutional claims to the
state courts." Id. at 837.
327. See State v. Hicks, 536 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Wis. App. 1995), aff'd, 549
N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1996).
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by ruling that such testing is not relevant to a Brady analysis
have not considered whether DNA results were relevant to the
prejudice inquiry. 328
Even if courts find that DNA testing is relevant to the pre-
judice prong, such analysis will not benefit many convicts, out-
side of the cases in which DNA testing or similarly compelling
evidence of innocence is available. Few convicts eventually ex-
onerated by post-conviction DNA testing had any new evidence
of innocence to present to the courts prior to obtaining DNA
testing. As a result, only thirty-three exonerees, or twenty-five
percent of those with written decisions studied in Judging In-
nocence, raised innocence-related claims. 329 Of those, seven ex-
onerees proffered third-party guilt evidence, seven presented
police reports suppressed at the time of trial, four presented re-
cantations of key witnesses, two presented new alibi evidence,
two presented new evidence undercutting informant testimony,
one presented evidence of police hypnosis of the victim, one
presented new forensic expert evidence, and one, Willie Jack-
son, offered the in-court confession of the true perpetrator
(some presented more than one type).330
Conversely, evidence of third-party guilt was the most
common claim and source of relief for DNA exonerees. For ex-
ample, in ruling on Willie Jackson's Strickland claim, the dis-
trict court emphasized that his brother had convincingly con-
fessed to the crime, which was relevant to the prejudice
328. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999)
(denying a discovery request for DNA evidence because the petitioner failed to
demonstrate a connection between DNA evidence and any cognizable claim);
Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding that DNA
testing is not relevant to a Brady claim where no argument is made that the
state was in possession of DNA evidence at the time of the trial).
329. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 110 (noting that only 33 of 113 exonerees
studied raised Brady, Schlup, Herrera, or newly discovered evidence claims).
330. The seven with third-party guilt evidence were K. Bloodsworth, R.
Bullock, D. Fritz, J. Jones, J. Watkins, K. Waters, and J. Willis; the four with
recantation evidence were L. Diaz, G. Dotson, C. Elkins, and F. Smith; the two
with evidence undercutting informants were J. Restivo and J. Watkins; the
two with new alibi evidence were S. Avery and K. Waters; J. Pierce had new
forensic expert evidence; L. Jean received a reversal based on the police hyp-
nosis of the victim in order to secure an identification. Those bringing claims
regarding suppressed police records were S. Fappiano, D. Hunt, L. Waters, E.
Washington (additional laboratory notes), W. Smith (statements to the police),
and R. Williamson (videotape of his polygraph examination).
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inquiry.33 1 Although Jackson's habeas petition was ultimately
dismissed by the Fifth Circuit, 33 2 four other DNA exonerees re-
ceived reversals based on third-party guilt prior to obtaining
the DNA testing that exonerated them; two received reversals
based on Brady claims; and two received reversals based on
state claims regarding exclusion at trial of third-party guilt
evidence. 333
c. Innocence and Harmless Error
A third and related approach incorporates new evidence of
innocence into the harmless error inquiry. For almost any con-
stitutional violation, a judge must deny relief if the State can
show that the error was either harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, or, on habeas corpus review, did not substantially con-
tribute to the conviction.3 3 4 Innocence plays no formal role in
the analysis, for a court focuses only on the degree to which a
violation tainted the trial.
However, new evidence of innocence may show that the
outcome at trial was otherwise unreliable. I propose that
courts, in conducting a harmless error inquiry, should consider
other evidence of innocence in determining whether constitu-
tional error affected the outcome. This requires no constitu-
tional reinterpretation, but merely reflects a more balanced
method for weighing evidence under the current Chapman v.
California335 and Brecht harmless error approaches. 336 Courts
already consider evidence of guilt unrelated to the constitution-
al violation. This approach modifies the traditional considera-
tion by inquiring whether evidence of guilt is reliable in light of
new evidence of innocence prior to deciding whether that evi-
dence renders error harmless. Incorporation of innocence into
harmless error review would impact only cases where petition-
ers have compelling new evidence of innocence to present. In
331. See Jackson v. Day, No. Civ. A. 950-1224, 1996 WL 225021, at *5 (E.D.
La. May 2, 1996), rev'd, 121 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1997) (table decision).
332. Jackson, 121 F.3d 705.
333. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 104 n.180.
334. See supra Part II.D.1.
335. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966).
336. See supra note 268 and accompanying text; see also Chapman, 386
U.S. at 24, 26; Garrett, supra note 306, at 56-63 (discussing the Chapman
test).
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such cases, this incorporation transforms the analysis to an in-
quiry focusing on both innocence and guilt.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL INNOCENCE CLAIM
The lack of a capstone innocence claim under the Federal
Constitution has resulted in a conflicted regime. One might ex-
pect that the advent of such powerful scientific evidence as
DNA would lead to a change in the rules surrounding that evi-
dence, from trial through the post-conviction process, so as to
facilitate access and assess the probative power of this evi-
dence. In some respects change has occurred, most notably with
increased pre-trial DNA testing and an explosion in new post-
conviction avenues for relief. Yet courts still do not routinely
ask the simple question whether new evidence of innocence suf-
ficiently undermines the conviction. Instead, a range of proce-
dural hurdles and categorical exclusions persist. Meanwhile,
the Court remains on the sidelines, only hypothetically suggest-
ing the existence of a constitutional innocence claim.
This Part describes how DNA and other technology-
because they can provide such powerful evidence of identity-
should alter the constitutional status of innocence during the
criminal process. Though the Court may continue to dodge the
issue for many decades to come, the wrongful conviction of an
innocent person is such an egregious miscarriage of justice that
several existing constitutional rights provide likely candidates
for relief. The advent of DNA testing undermines the Court's
two central rationales for avoiding the question of whether an
innocence claim exists. Selecting a standard of review for an
innocence claim does pose difficult questions, but I suggest an
outcome-determinative standard that draws a line between
outcome-altering and inconclusive cases.
A. HERRERA REVISITED
Our constitutional regime developed in an era in which in-
nocence could rarely be proven with any certainty. Appellate
courts, not in a position to observe and weigh the probative
power of witness testimony and physical evidence, could not
sensibly review outcomes. Instead, courts developed constitu-
tional rules to preserve the "fundamental fairness" of criminal
trials, such as by providing all defendants with procedural
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guarantees and by excluding evidence that would be grossly
unreliable. 337 Nor was habeas corpus traditionally considered a
proper place to raise questions of guilt or innocence. As the
Court stated in Townsend v. Sain, "the existence merely of
newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state pris-
oner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus."338
Hence, the advent of DNA testing did not easily fit within
the existing constitutional regime. Although the Court wrestled
with the significance of DNA testing in House, it did not recog-
nize a constitutional innocence claim. Had the Court reconsi-
dered Herrera in House, it might have concluded that the ad-
vent of DNA testing upended the two pillars supporting the
decision: reliability and finality.
In Herrera, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Tho-
mas joined the majority decision penned by Chief Justice
Rehnquist that held federal habeas review is intended only "to
ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution-not to correct errors of fact" occurring in state
criminal trials.33 9 This begs the question whether innocence
implicates the "constitutionality" of a detention. The Herrera
majority, however, did not address that question.
Herrera, a Texas death-row prisoner, argued that it would
violate the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment for him to be ex-
ecuted, due to his asserted actual innocence. 340 Six Justices in
Herrera agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment supports a
freestanding claim for actual innocence. 341 Two of those Justic-
es, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, joined the majority result
that denied relief.342 Thus, the holding of Herrera remains the
narrower opinion by Justice Rehnquist, 343 which disclaimed the
337. See infra text accompanying notes 368-71.
338. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1962).
339. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (citing Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.)).
340. Id. at 393.
341. See id. at 419 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); id. at 429
(White, J., concurring); id. at 435 (Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissent-
ing).
342. Id. at 421 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring).
343. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("[W]hen a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result en-
joys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
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existence of any constitutional innocence right. Even though
the opinion assumed, "for the sake of argument," that an inno-
cence right exists, it made clear that such a claim would re-
quire a "truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence,"' a
standard that Herrera could not meet. 344 Despite Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy stating that a freestanding innocence
claim should exist, they joined the majority opinion because
Herrera's facts were very unfavorable, and his evidence of in-
nocence was scant. This was no DNA case; Herrera's only evi-
dence of innocence consisted of hearsay affidavits by three indi-
viduals who waited over eight years to claim that Herrera's
brother, now dead, was the culprit.345 The result in Herrera was
perfectly understandable as a decision addressing an innocence
claim with little merit.
The advent of DNA evidence should cause us to question
the underpinnings of Herrera: the concepts of finality and re-
liability. The Court did not chiefly rely on constitutional inter-
pretation in Herrera, but rather on those two policy considera-
tions, and thus this Section discusses those rationales before
turning to the constitutional text. First, the Court relied in
Herrera chiefly on the need to preserve finality,346 one of the
central principles animating the Court's recent habeas corpus
jurisprudence. 347 Texas courts had a rule that limited the filing
of motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of
innocence to a period within sixty days after entry of judgment
rowest grounds ...."' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.))).
344. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (majority opinion); see also The Supreme
Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 282 (1993).
345. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
346. Id. at 401 ("Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal sys-
tem than to provide for federal habeas review on freestanding claims of actual
innocence.").
347. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) ("The reason
most frequently advanced in our cases for distinguishing between direct and
collateral review is the State's interest in the finality of convictions that have
survived direct review within the state court system."); see also McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) ("Finality has special importance in the context
of a federal attack on a state conviction."); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
90 (1977) (discussing the importance of deciding all issues at trial). See gener-
ally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (discussing the importance of fi-
nality in such situations).
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of conviction.348 The Court noted that the practice in states re-
mained "divergent," as seventeen states, like Texas, provided
for sixty days or less, fifteen states allowed the motion to be
filed more than three years after conviction, and the other
states permitted motions somewhere in between. 349
This pillar supporting the Herrera result has been toppled
by the advent of DNA testing. When Herrera was decided in
1993, only four years after DNA evidence had become available,
the Court cited the divided "contemporary practice in the
States" regarding claims of new evidence of innocence. 350 That
practice has dramatically shifted, and as just described, almost
all states enacted statutes to permit relief on the basis of newly
discovered DNA or other scientific evidence of innocence. As
noted above, not only do all but five jurisdictions ensure some
access to post-conviction DNA testing upon which motions
based on new evidence of innocence may be filed, all but three
jurisdictions now make exceptions to any statutes of limitations
to permit motions supported by new evidence of innocence. 351
Indeed, while problematic in a number of respects, almost all of
the newly enacted statutes go much farther than Herrera by
providing for testing and a vacatur in most serious criminal
cases, rather than just in capital cases. And while many sta-
tutes contain various restrictions on access to testing, these re-
strictions do not rest on notions of finality. Further, few of the
statutes restrict in any way (or define) the conditions under
which a court may grant relief regarding new evidence of inno-
cence.
The Court continues to rely on a finality rationale that has
since been abandoned by the states. In addition to finality, the
Herrera Court also emphasized federalism as a justification for
its decision. The Court noted that "[flew rulings would be more
disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal ha-
beas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence," given
that state statutes of limitations codified a concern for finali-
ty. 352 The Court noted that "[o]nce a defendant has been af-
forded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was
348. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410.
349. Id. at 410-11.
350. Id. at 411.
351. See supra Part II.C.2-3.
352. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401.
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charged, the presumption of innocence disappears,"35 3 demon-
strating its concern for federalism principles. Most states, how-
ever, now allow for post-conviction DNA testing.
Further undermining a federalism rationale, the AEDPA
now requires that any actual innocence claim would have to be
first exhausted in the state courts, and it also entitles state
court factual determinations to a presumption of correctness. 35 4
Paradoxically, establishing an innocence claim under the U.S.
Constitution may reduce the burgeoning litigation of innocence
in federal habeas corpus cases by ensuring that petitioners be
required to first seek available state remedies, and therefore
providing strong incentives for states to make adequate reme-
dies available.
A second pillar of the Herrera decision was reliability. The
Court's decision "rests on assumptions about the fallibility of
the search for truth" that the advent of DNA technology top-
pled.355 The Court in Herrera emphasized that "the passage of
time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications"
due to the "erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses."356
Granting Herrera's request would, in the words of the Court,
place the district court in the "difficult" position of having to
"weigh the probative value of 'hot' and 'cold' evidence."35 7 This
concern was logical in Herrera itself because witnesses' "belated
affidavits" were the only "new" evidence. 358 However, DNA evi-
dence alters the reliability analysis because it produces accu-
rate results, if properly stored, for decades after biological ma-
terial is gathered.359 Reliability concerns no longer provide
strong support for the Court's decision in Herrera, at least not
in cases in which such new scientific evidence may be far more
reliable than the evidence that was presented at trial.
353. Id. at 399.
354. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (d) (2000); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 440-41
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
355. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 160, at 599-600.
356. See also Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403-04 (majority opinion) ("[Wihen a ha-
beas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the 'erosion of memory and
dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time' prejudice the gov-
ernment and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication ....
(quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)) (alteration in original)).
357. Id. at 404.
358. Id. at 418.
359. See Christopher H. Asplen, Integrating DNA Technology into the
Criminal Justice System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 146 (1999).
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Although its original underpinnings have eroded, it is poss-
ible other concerns could justify the holding in Herrera. One
concern not discussed by the Court in Herrera is deterrence.
This omission is unsurprising, however, for deterrence itself is
undermined when the innocent continue to be punished while
the guilty go free. 360 Similarly, another concern could be the
cost of relitigating judgments. As the Court noted in Schlup,
however, the number of meritorious innocence claims will not
be high. 36 1 DNA testing itself is increasingly inexpensive. And
outside the majority of states that now pay for access to DNA
testing, nonprofit innocence projects willingly fund this test-
ing.362 Further, federal courts already conduct a range of time-
consuming factual review focusing on questions of guilt and in-
nocence, which includes review of newly discovered evidence of
innocence. As the dissenters in Herrera noted, over the past
several decades, "the Court adopted the view of Judge Friendly
that there should be an exception to the concept of finality
when a prisoner can make a colorable claim of actual inno-
cence." 363 As discussed above, federal judges review guilt and
innocence in myriad ways, but they cannot provide relief to pe-
titioners raising free-standing innocence claims. As this Section
has demonstrated, neither original nor current rationales pro-
vide strong support for Herrera, suggesting the need to consider
a constitutional framework for review of innocence claims,
which the next Section develops.
B. INNOCENCE AND DUE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause provides a natural foundation for
a claim of innocence. Justice Scalia expressed a view to the con-
trary in Herrera, stating that
there is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice
(if that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to de-
mand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence
360. See A. Mitchell Polsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Pub-
lic Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 60-62 (2000) (showing
that erroneous convictions lower deterrence by reducing the difference be-
tween the penalties expected from violating the law and from not violating it).
361. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1995).
362. See, e.g., Innocence Project, About the Organization, http://www
.innocenceproject.org/aboutMission- Statement.php (last visited Apr. 26,
2008).
363. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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brought forward after conviction .... With any luck, we shall avoid
ever having to face this embarrassing question again. 364
Unsurprisingly, the Court faced the embarrassing question
again, in House, and because it again failed to resolve the exis-
tence of an innocence claim-this time in an era in which new
technology more readily proves innocence-the Court may con-
tinue to face this question. A less conclusory look at text, tradi-
tion, and contemporary practice is entirely justified.
First, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
basis for "an independent constitutional violation" if an indi-
vidual would be subjected to criminal punishment despite ac-
tual innocence. 365 The Due Process Clause provides that mini-
mally fair due process be afforded to those deprived by the
government of life, liberty, or property, with the amount of
process required dependent on its cost, the risk of error, and
the individual interest at stake.366 A strong procedural due
process argument in favor of recognizing an innocence claim
can be made given the very low cost of considering new evi-
dence of innocence, the great interest of both the prisoner and
the State in correcting a wrongful conviction, and the reduction
in the risk of erroneous determinations due to the reliability of
new scientific evidence, including DNA technology. 367
In addition, the concerns of fundamental fairness that un-
derlie our constitutional criminal procedure seek to prevent
imprisoning an innocent person, and therefore support an inno-
cence claim.3 68 As Justice Lewis Powell wrote in Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, "a prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest
in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the
charge for which he was incarcerated." 369 Similarly, in his con-
currence in Herrera, Justice Byron White focused on the
Court's due process rationale in Jackson v. Virginia, which held
364. Id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
365. Id. at 400 (majority opinion).
366. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
367. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 160, at 593-94 (developing a
procedural due process theory of a right to potentially exculpatory DNA test-
ing post-conviction); see also George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late
for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L.
REV. 263 (2003) (arguing that the Due Process Clause requires allowing inde-
pendent claims of actual innocence in cases with "powerful claims").
368. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 435 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
369. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986).
2008] 1705
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that the conviction should be overturned if a jury could not
have rationally convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.37 0 Finally,
the Court's aforementioned and longstanding jurisprudence
surrounding interests of trial accuracy and fundamental fair-
ness supports an innocence claim where the jury would not,
based on new evidence, convict beyond a reasonable doubt.37 1
The Court has also interpreted the Due Process Clause as
providing substantive protections. As the Herrera dissenters
and Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion pointed out,
decades of substantive due process opinions ruled out practices
"contrary to contemporary standards of decency 372 or "shocking
to the conscience" 373 or contrary to a 'principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.' 374 Those Justices concluded that con-
victing an innocent person runs contrary to fundamental prin-
ciples of justice.
In addition to due process, both the Eighth and Sixth
Amendments could provide support for a freestanding inno-
cence claim. While the Herrera majority did not address the is-
sue, the dissenters in Herrera advocated extending the Eighth
Amendment to innocent people facing capital punishment.37 5
The dissenters argued that "executing an innocent person epi-
tomizes 'the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering"' and therefore constitutes "cruel and unusual pu-
nishment" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 376
Similar arguments can be made that it would be cruel and un-
usual to punish innocent people by incarcerating them for non-
capital offenses.3 77
370. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Vir-
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
371. See supra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
372. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)); id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(same).
373. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)); id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
374. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 406,
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, and Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46
(1992)).
375. Id. at 431-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 431-32 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
377. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence
for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943,
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Another previously unexplored source in the Constitution
that supports an innocence claim arises from the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. 378 In the Apprendi line of deci-
sions, the Court held that criminal defendants have a right to
have a jury find all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, as well as any facts that affect the length of their sen-
tence. 379 In part due to the truth-finding purpose of a jury, the
Court has defined this as a bright-line rule.38 0 One can argue
that a defendant does not receive a valid jury trial if false evi-
dence on a material issue was presented to the jurors. Howev-
er, such Sixth Amendment review would still be subject to a
harmless error analysis. 38 1
In response to the dissent, the Herrera majority cited to the
range of celebrated constitutional protections that ensure
against wrongful convictions, but then noted that .'[d]ue
process does not require that every conceivable step be taken,
at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an
innocent person."'3 8 2 Here, too, technology has changed the
analysis. The cost of DNA testing is fairly low, with the most
expensive tests costing a few thousand dollars and with the
typical price being much less.383 As noted, some states have
1012 (1994).
378. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
379. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
380. The Court stated in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005),
that the Sixth Amendment serves to secure "the interest in fairness and relia-
bility protected by the right to a jury trial . . . [which] has always outweighed
the interest in concluding trials swiftly." See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477.
381. All fifty states adopt the harmless error doctrine, which allows "a re-
viewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that
are harmless, including most constitutional violations." United States v. Lane,
474 U.S. 428, 445 (1986) (referring also to the congressional policy embodied in
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000), which provides that "judgments shall not be reversed
for 'errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties"');
see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 420
(2d ed. 2007) (explaining that "a trial error that is not of constitutional dimen-
sion ... is harmless when it plainly appears from the facts and circumstances
of the case that the error did not affect the verdict").
382. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
383. At the upper end, DNA tests can cost several thousand dollars. See
Teresa Johnson, Orange County's Innocence Project, ORANGE COUNTY LAW.,
Dec. 2001, at 18, 19. The price also depends on how many pieces of evidence
must be tested and the types of tests employed. See, e.g., Tania Simoncelli &
Barry Stenhardt, California's Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Crim-
inal DNA Databases, DNA FINGERPRINTING & CIv. LIBERTIES, Summer 2006,
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passed statutes agreeing to pay for testing.384 If the state in
certain categories of cases was unwilling to pay for testing, the
costs of testing would likely be borne by a nonprofit Innocence
Project; such projects have often paid for DNA testing in cases
where the results might exculpate. 38 5 Even supposing that the
state did pay for every DNA test without federal or nonprofit
assistance, doing so would still cost far less to the state than
the litigation of the typical criminal procedure claims prisoners
bring, which can demand complex briefing and judicial review
during lengthy state and federal appeals that can last for years.
The minimal cost of DNA testing is also overwhelmed by
the cost of keeping an innocent person behind bars, even
putting to one side the social cost of such a wrongful incarcera-
tion. One must also consider the great social cost arising from
cases in which the actual perpetrator continues to commit addi-
tional serial crimes, as many did in the cases for which individ-
uals were exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing. 38 6
Not only are the costs of litigating claims of innocence far
less than the great sums we already expend on far more time-
consuming and resource-intensive claims, but there is also little
danger of the floodgates opening such that courts would be in-
at 199, 209 (describing the average cost of testing DNA of blood samples at one
lab as $315 per sample).
384. Many states require payment for DNA testing only if the petitioner is
able to pay. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-
9.1-12(c) (2007). But see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(g) (LexisNexis
2007) (stating that the petitioner shall pay expenses unless the results are fa-
vorable to the petitioner, in which case the court shall order the state to pay).
385. Thus, proposals to sanction petitioners whose guilt is confirmed by
post-conviction DNA testing have little merit and overstate the costs of test-
ing, which are continually decreasing. See, e.g., Gwendolyn Carroll, Comment,
Proven Guilty: An Examination of the Penalty-Free World of Post-Conviction
DNA Testing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665, 692-97 (2007) (proposing
the adoption of a system like Missouri's, whereby petitioners whose tests con-
firm guilt are sanctioned through the loss of good time credit); see also Mo.
REV. STAT. § 650.058 (2007). Yet deterring meritorious applications is socially
costly for reasons discussed. In contrast, DNA testing that confirms guilt may
terminate otherwise burdensome appeals. Further, many for whom DNA test-
ing is relevant serve life terms or face the death penalty, and such a proposal
would have little effect on those individuals. Cf. Carroll, supra, at 695 (recog-
nizing that "this proposal ... would have no consequences for a petitioner who
has accumulated no good time credit").
386. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 119 (relaying that 37% of the first two
hundred DNA exonerations involved identification of the perpetrator, and
24.5% through a "cold hit" in which the perpetrator had subsequently been in-
volved in additional crimes and was identified in a felon database).
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undated with innocence claims. On the one hand, where the
technology has continued to improve, the very same convicts
may seek repeated tests. Indeed, some have been exonerated
only by improved testing technology after initial testing was in-
conclusive.38 7 Yet most criminal cases do not often both have
identity as a disputed issue and also involve relevant biological
evidence. Currently, a narrow category of prisoners can be ex-
onerated pursuant to an innocence claim. To date, 216 prison-
ers have been exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing
through the Innocence Project alone.388 Additional cases may
involve other scientific or otherwise compelling evidence of in-
nocence, though such non-DNA cases may sometimes pose
more difficult questions for courts depending on how probative
the new scientific evidence is.389
Our post-conviction system does not resemble any model of
efficient dispute resolution. That system typically imposes a
range of procedural barriers that limit assertion of innocence
claims, based on the view that any new avenue for review of
innocence claims imposes a new cost on the system. However,
innocent convicts without an avenue for innocence-based relief
will typically not just face routine dismissals of innocence
claims, but will instead pursue traditional remedies and assert
innocence through indirect and procedurally difficult-to-
adjudicate means. Guilty appellants will do the same. Review-
ing innocence claims certainly provides far more targeted relief
than the raft of criminal procedure rules that apply compre-
hensively to regulate all criminal investigations and trials.
The only consideration remaining from the Herrera deci-
sion is tradition. In support of its decision, the Herrera Court
387. For an example, see the story of Stephen Avery, who was exonerated
by more sophisticated DNA technology after spending more than eighteen
years in prison. Wisconsin Innocence Project, Steven Avery Exonerated After
18 Years in Prison, http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/avery-summary.htm
(last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
388. The Innocence Project, supra note 3.
389. For example, revelations regarding improper testimony by FBI ana-
lysts concerning bullet lead comparison may result in a series of reversed con-
victions in non-DNA cases. John Solomon, FBI Forensic Test Full of Holes,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at Al (describing how hundreds of defendants'
convictions are now in question due to now-discredited FBI bullet lead testi-
mony introduced at their trials); see also John Solomon, Silent Injustice: Bul-
let-Matching Science Debunked, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2007/11/15/DI2007111501575
.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
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cited the paucity of relief available after trial at common law390
(though explanations for lack of such post-conviction remedies
at common law include the lack of prisons and near-summary
execution for felonies). Such long-ago discarded practices have
no relevance today, nor do comparatively recent post-conviction
rules-now amended by DNA statutes-that limited claims
based on new evidence of innocence. While in the past a court
reviewed the fairness of a trial with difficulty, in an era where
innocence can be proved with great certainty, a court is in a far
better position to assess actual innocence. Indeed, why have
constitutional criminal procedural protections "ensuring
against the risk of convicting an innocent person" if federal
courts must remain powerless when convicted individuals are
known to be innocent?39 1
C. AN OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE STANDARD
The above discussion suggests several constitutional
sources, some considered by the Court but none established,
that could ground a constitutional innocence claim. What form
such a claim should take and under what standard innocence
should be assessed remain important questions. Any meaning-
ful standard would ensure at a minimum that substantial
claims of innocence receive relief, for when new evidence of in-
nocence demonstrates someone's innocence either substantially
or clearly and convincingly, there is little, if any, justification
for denying relief. Courts should decide whether to grant a new
trial based on the outcome-based more-likely-than-not standard
advanced by the Herrera dissenters and adopted by the Court
in House in the context of excusing procedural default. The
Court in House emphasized that Schiup review requires "a ho-
listic judgment about 'all the evidence' and its likely effect on
reasonable jurors applying the reasonable-doubt standard."392
Adopting that standard would ensure relief in cases where
scientific or other evidence shows innocence so strongly that a
new jury would probably not convict, and the standard would
also deter frivolous filings.
What I have termed substantial claims of innocence face no
difficulty meeting this standard; by definition such claims sa-
390. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993).
391. Id. at 398.
392. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006) (citation omitted).
1710 [92:1629
CLAIMING INNOCENCE
tisfy a higher clear and convincing standard of review. Other
cases, perhaps like House, will pose harder questions in which
the petitioner would have to persuade the court that "more like-
ly than not" no reasonable juror would convict in light of the
new evidence of innocence. 393
Though neither has adopted such a standard in the context
of innocence claims, federal appellate courts have long applied
outcome-determinative standards in the context of constitu-
tional claims, and many state courts apply such a standard for
new trial motions. 394 Further, following House, courts now have
guidance regarding the central importance of DNA evidence to
a holistic inquiry, making it more difficult for a court to impro-
perly deny relief using hypothetical scenarios in the face of a
clear exclusion. And even if DNA evidence does not totally un-
dercut evidence at trial, it may still raise sufficient questions
such that no reasonable juror would come out the same way.395
Other cases may remain inconclusive and would not satisfy the
standard.396 In those situations, a petitioner would have to first
exhaust state process, as § 2254 requires for the consideration
of any constitutional claim during federal habeas corpus pro-
393. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995). A few state courts adopt such
a formal distinction between relatively easier and harder cases. For example,
the Nebraska courts vacate a conviction if DNA results exclude, but courts
may instead grant a new trial if merely exculpatory DNA results suggest a
probability of a substantially different outcome at trial. See, e.g., State v.
Buckman, 675 N.W.2d 372, 381 (Neb. 2004).
394. As the Court put it in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693
(1984), an "outcome-determinative standard has several strengths. It defines
the relevant inquiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is in-
evitable, is anything but precise." State courts typically adopt the same stan-
dard for new trial motions; for example, New York asks whether it is probable
that new evidence of innocence would have caused a different result. See N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (McKinney 2005).
395. For example, Lonnie Erby, convicted of the serial rape of three tee-
nage girls, was exonerated based on DNA testing of two rapes, but the crime
scene evidence was destroyed in a third separate incident prosecuted as part
of the same serial pattern of attacks; the court concluded that the DNA evi-
dence from the two cases also supported a vacatur in the third. See Peter
Shinkle, Man Cleared by DNA Tests Is Freed After 17 Years, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 26, 2003, at Al.
396. A case that raised great difficulties for the Wisconsin courts involved
DNA testing that uncovered two male profiles, one that was not the convict,
but one that was inconclusive. See State v. Armstrong, 700 N.W.2d 98, 128-29
(Wis. 2005) (reversing for a new trial, concluding that "[t]he jury did not have
an opportunity to hear and evaluate the DNA evidence that excludes
Armstrong as the source of the hairs and the semen").
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ceedings, 397 which would create pressure for states to resolve
innocence claims in the first instance.
Likewise, the existence of an innocence right under the
Due Process Clause would affect the conduct of local law en-
forcement, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.398 Vacat-
ing a conviction and granting a new trial confronts the prosecu-
tor with deciding whether sufficient evidence exists to retry a
case. In those situations where witnesses are still available and
where the prosecutor is convinced the case has merit, a retrial
may be pursued. For that reason, a post-conviction reversal
does not necessarily ensure that a wrongful conviction is reme-
died; indeed, a dozen exonerees had more than one retrial-two
had three trials-before DNA testing ultimately exonerated
them.399
D. INSTITUTIONALIZING INNOCENCE REVIEW
In this Part, I have described and then advocated a consti-
tutional claim of innocence with an outcome-based standard
applicable to all convicts. Such a claim is far broader than the
one narrowly rejected by the Supreme Court in Herrera. Even
in the absence of a uniform innocence claim correlated to the
evidence's probative impact, new evidence of innocence already
has altered the inquiry for constitutional criminal procedure
claims. Commentators feared that a shift towards reviewing
innocence claims might weaken constitutional criminal proce-
dure protections while benefiting only a narrow group of actual-
ly innocent persons. 40 0 That shift has already occurred, as DNA
evidence has reshaped how our criminal system reviews cases
at every stage. It is hard to maintain that our system should
not always provide relief to the identifiable, actually innocent
convicts, especially when the costs of identifying them may be
far less than resolving the complex procedural claims they
would otherwise assert.
397. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000).
398. Concealment of evidence of innocence would violate Brady for a new
reason, because doing so would involve suppression of potentially outcome de-
terminative evidence relevant to a claim of innocence. See supra note 271 and
accompanying text.
399. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 98-99.
400. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of
Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital
Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587 (2005).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court appears unlikely to in-
terpret the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional pro-
vision as supporting an innocence claim of the type described.
Nor have most states adopted anything like the optimal statute
advanced, which simply assesses the probative impact of new
evidence of innocence.
Adding still more gloom to the picture, there are good rea-
sons to think that whatever standard of review is adopted, con-
stitutional or statutory, courts may misinterpret it to deny re-
lief to the innocent because of an adherence to finality, however
wrongheaded. After all, appellate courts have long been criti-
cized for inconsistent application of the more permissive
Chapman harmless error standard, which, like any potential
innocence claim, requires courts to weigh evidence of guilt.40 1
My dataset of the first two hundred post-conviction DNA ex-
onerees provides additional reasons to distrust appellate adju-
dication of innocence claims. In these exonerees' cases, courts
frequently found constitutional error to be harmless, and even
called the evidence of guilt "overwhelming."402
Indeed, federal and state courts denied at least twelve ex-
onerees relief despite being presented with DNA test results
excluding them.403 For example, after DNA test results ex-
cluded Stephen Avery, the Wisconsin intermediate court never-
theless denied his appeal. 404 The court concluded that even
DNA evidence did not meet the fairly lenient reasonable-
401. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harm-
less: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1171-72
(1995) (describing the application of the harmless error doctrine as the "guilt-
based approach"); James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht v. Abrahamson:
Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109,
1110-11 (1994) (noting the varying impact of Brecht on the application of the
harmless error doctrine in different courts); Mitchell, supra note 268, at 1335
(explaining the three harmless error tests and arguing that the disparity be-
tween the tests may determine whether a conviction is upheld or overturned);
Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can Help
Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1053, 1059-
64 (2005) (noting that most scholars believe the different approaches are irre-
concilable).
402. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 107-09.
403. Those exonerees are S. Avery, R. Criner, W. Dedge, C. Elkins, D. Hals-
tead, A. Hicks, L. Holdren, D. Hunt, J. Kogut, L. McSherry, J. Restivo, and J.
Watkins. For profiles of those individuals, see The Innocence Project, supra
note 123.
404. State v. Avery, 570 N.W.2d 573, 580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
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probability standard under a state new-trial statute.40 5 In mak-
ing this determination, the court relied on the certainty of the
victim who identified him, who said, "It's as if I have a photo-
graph in my mind."406 A court did not vacate Avery's conviction
until six years later, in 2002, when more powerful DNA testing
confirmed the exclusion and also resulted in a cold hit with a
prisoner who was incarcerated for crimes similar to the ones
with which Avery was charged. 40 7 Thus, because of the possibil-
ity courts will misinterpret the standards applicable to an inno-
cence claim, such rulings may persist even if legislators and
courts adopt the proposed standard for assessing claims based
on the probative impact of new evidence of innocence.
In light of the reluctance of courts to upset finality and the
unlikelihood the Court will adopt a constitutional innocence
claim, our system could instead turn to outside institutions to
review innocence claims. The United Kingdom, for example,
empowers its Criminal Cases Revision Commission to investi-
gate wrongful convictions. 408 Similarly, in Canada, a Minister
of Justice can convene a Criminal Conviction Review that can
order a new trial.409 North Carolina has adopted such an ap-
proach, creating an Innocence Commission to determine
whether a convict has shown factual innocence. 410 The Com-
mission then refers cases to a three-judge panel that has au-
thority to grant a new trial.4 11 In addition to North Carolina,
five other states have created innocence commissions or study
commissions.4 12
Such institutions can also be created within the criminal
justice system. Prosecutor's offices have established internal
405. Id. at 581 ("[T]he presence of DNA from an unidentified third party
did not create a reasonable probability of a different result on retrial.").
406. Id. at 580.
407. See Wisconsin Innocence Project, supra note 387.
408. I assess Innocence Commissions and the United Kingdom model in a
prior work. See Garrett, supra note 324, at 437.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 438 (describing Innocence Commissions in California, Connecti-
cut, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also Sandra Svoboda, Righting the
Wrongfuls: DNA Lessons Guide Proposed Laws, METRO TIMES (Detroit), Oct.
17, 2007, http://www.metrotimes.com/editorialstory.asp?id=l1932 (discussing
current legislative proposals in Michigan).
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institutions to review potential wrongful conviction cases, 413 as
have public defenders, sometimes in collaboration with mem-
bers of the nationwide network of Innocence Projects. 414 In ad-
dition, courts have engaged in systemic inquiries, conducting
DNA testing and reviewing cases as part of inquiries into faulty
case work in forensic laboratories. 415 Finally, state pardon pro-
cedures and boards can and do consider evidence of actual in-
nocence, and could do so in a more formalized manner; such
remedies remain discretionary, however.416
These new institutions remain new, largely untested, and
highly experimental. Yet regardless of the approach adopted,
there are reasons to think that an institution acquainted with
the causes of wrongful convictions and with special administra-
tive expertise in reviewing claims of innocence could do a better
job than generalist appellate courts when reviewing claims of
innocence.
Evaluating the probative impact of new exculpatory evi-
dence produces a narrow band of cases from which innocence
claims can be more readily identified and remedied. It takes no
more analysis to separate substantial and outcome-
determinative from inconclusive cases than it does to conduct
complex post-conviction harmless error inquiries. This is espe-
cially true since, regardless of the actor conducting the inno-
cence review, the inquiry should be limited to the probative im-
pact of the new evidence of innocence. The continued
application of categorical exclusions, guilt-based standards, and
procedural limitations on access to evidence of innocence and
413. Garrett, supra note 324, at 440-41.
414. See Jennifer Emily, Dallas County OKs Adding Post to Review DNA
Requests, WFAA.COM (Dallas), Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.wfaa.com
sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/101707dnmetdaldna.17a13e9f8
.html.
415. See Garrett, supra note 324, at 412-16 (describing the West Virginia
Supreme Court's appointment of a Special Master to review cases affected by
state crime laboratory forensic fraud); see also Roma Khanna & Steve McVick-
er, Panel Will Review 180 HPD [Houston Police Department] Crime Lab Cases,
Hous. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 20049034 ("Harris
County criminal district judges are poised to appoint a panel to review 180
cases with problematic Houston crime lab evidence, ending a dispute about
how to scrutinize those cases.").
416. See Dow et al., supra note 196, app. B (providing a comprehensive
survey of state pardon and clemency procedures and structures and noting
any provisions for review of new evidence of innocence).
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relief will ensure that wrongful convictions and high-profile ex-
onerations persist.
Our system should certainly not view post-conviction re-
view as a substitute for efforts to more accurately determine
innocence at the trial level. If evidence of innocence is properly
developed at trial, appellate and post-conviction judging be-
comes less necessary. In Part II, I recommended criminal in-
vestigation and trial protections to ensure that DNA testing is
conducted properly, test results and lab notes are disclosed,
and evidence is properly preserved. Other efforts to ensure a
more reliable investigative record, such as requiring police to
videotape confessions and eyewitness identifications, can better
inform those tasked with judging innocence after the fact.
Avoiding wrongful convictions in the first instance can hopeful-
ly reduce the need to assess claims of innocence during criminal
appeals and post-conviction proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Everything and nothing has changed since 1970, when
Judge Friendly called the lack of a freestanding constitutional
innocence claim "an anomaly. 4 17 Decades later, the status of
claims of innocence is no longer anomalous. Yet, despite a surge
in the consideration of innocence claims in various forms, well
into the DNA age, remedies for innocence remains incomplete.
This seems intuitively odd. A false conviction is fundamentally
unjust in any system of law; indeed, the Supreme Court has
long recognized this, characterizing federal review as "designed
to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal
justice systems."4 18 Those words ring hollow when the Court
continually refuses to recognize an innocence claim, even when
presented with convincing proof of "extreme malfunctions."4 19
In response to the Court's failure, almost all states have
enacted statutes to permit relief based on evidence of inno-
cence, since, after all, it is the states and local governments
who face first-hand the injustice and political embarrassment
of mounting numbers of DNA exonerations. Although the crea-
tion of this new post-conviction avenue represents a definitive
417. See Friendly, supra note 1, at 158-60 & n.87.
418. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., con-
curring).
419. Id.
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turn away from finality, states have included in these statutes
arbitrary restrictions that deny DNA testing to those who could
otherwise prove innocence if given the chance, and that block
relief to many who have demonstrated, to a high degree of cer-
tainty, their innocence.
Our criminal system's conflicted reaction to the advent of
DNA testing illuminates the strained relationship between
science, technology, and the substance and procedure of crimi-
nal law protections. The Supreme Court could ensure a more
uniform approach towards claims of innocence by adopting a
constitutional innocence claim. This remains unlikely. In
House, the Court evaded its most recent opportunity to estab-
lish such a claim, instead permitting only "gateway" relief.4 20
The Court did, however, point the way towards a sensible stan-
dard of review for innocence claims by highlighting the role of
probative but not dispositive DNA evidence, and by adopting an
outcome-determinative standard that asks if a new jury would
still convict. Whether the Court eventually reaches the issue or
not, the groundwork for an innocence-based regime has
emerged. Already, lower federal courts recognize that the abili-
ty to prove innocence alters the analysis of underlying criminal
procedure rights and application of a harmless error analysis.
The advent of DNA testing created enormous pressure at
each stage of the criminal process to provide relief to those who
can prove their innocence. Miscarriages of justice uncovered
through DNA testing, DNA databanks, and other evolving
technology will continue to test our criminal justice system as it
adapts to new methods of proof. Yet only if our criminal justice
system adopts stronger protections to secure access to evidence
of innocence during investigations and trials can wrongful con-
victions be averted in the first instance. Due process should be
understood to require full access to DNA and other scientific
evidence at the time of trial. Until our criminal trial courts en-
sure such access, post-conviction DNA exonerations will main-
tain pressure on political actors to create more effective reme-
dies by, for example, revising statutory innocence claims, or by
establishing Innocence Commissions to review potential wrong-
ful convictions. Similarly, the Supreme Court will continue to
face the question whether to recognize a freestanding constitu-
tional claim of innocence. While constitutional interpretation
420. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006).
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lags, new technology will persist in illuminating powerful new
evidence of innocence. As technology drives change, the existing
constellation of rights and remedies in our criminal system may
finally evolve to ensure full access to evidence of innocence at
trial, as well as a meaningful post-conviction avenue for claims
of innocence.
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APPENDIX: STATE POST-CONVICTION DNA STATUTES
aa
Alabama No statute
Alaska No statute
Arizona ARIZ. REV. 2000 R
SWAT. ANN.
§ 13-4240 (2001
& Supp. 2007)
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. 2001 R I, T C
§§ 16-112-201 to
-207 (2006 &
Supp. 2007)
California CAL.PENAL 2000 R Y0
CODE
A 1405 (West
Supp. 2008)
Colorado COLO. REV. 2003 M Y
STAT.
§§ 18-1-411 to
416 (2007)
Connecticut CONN.GEN. 2003 R Y
SWAT.§ 54-102kk
(2007)
Delaware DEL. CODEANN. 2000 R Y I, T C
tit. 11,
4504( 2007)
District of D.C. CODE 2002 R Y
Columbia §§ 22-4131 to
-4133
(Supp.2007)
Florida FLA.SWAT. 2001R
§ 925. 11,
943.3251 (2007)
421. (L) Just a likelihood (the DNA test results could be relevant to inno-
cence); (R) Materiality (or reasonable probability that testing could prove in-
nocence); (M) More probable than not (preponderance); (C) Clear and convinc-
ing or a substantial showing.
422. (A) Trial attorney fault; (C) Limited to certain crimes (typically felo-
nies); (G) Guilty plea cases excluded; (I) Identity must have been an issue at
trial; (S) Sunset provision; (T) Time limit.
423. If left blank, the trial judge has discretion whether to provide relief.
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BID a) 0 _Q a
Geri.A OD N.20 R CO
-' Z; 0 cu
_ 5) ~~0*~§05-5-41(c).
co a,
-1v r-_3t
0S 0
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. 2003 R C
§ 5-5-41(c)
(Supp. 2007)
Hawaii HAW. REV. 2005 R
STAT.
§§ 844D- 121 to
-133
(Supp. 2007)
Idaho IDAHO CODE 2001 R Y I, T
ANN.
§§ 19-4901(a)
(6), 4902(b)-(f)
(2004)
Illinois 725 ILL. COMp. 1997 R Y I
STAT. 5/116-3
(2006)
Indiana IND. CODE 2001 R C
§§ 35-38-7-1 to
-19 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2007)
Iowa IOWA CODE 2005 R C, I
§ 81.10 (2007)
Kansas KAN. STAT. 2001 L Y C
ANN.
§ 21-2512
(Supp. 2006)
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. 2002 R Y C4 2
4
ANN.
§ 422.285
(LexisNexis
Supp. 2007)
Louisiana LA. CODE CRIM. 2001 R C, S
PROC. ANN. art.
926.1
(Supp. 2008)
Maine ME. REV. STAT. 2001 R Y Y C, I, C
ANN. tit. 15, T
§§ 2137-2138
(Supp. 2007)
424. Capital cases only.
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ca zZ r W
r) 5 -Z ota .~ Eo> ....
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., 2001 R C
CRIM. PROC.
§ 8-201
(Supp. 2007)
Massachu- No statute
setts
Michigan MICH. COMP. 2001 R Y C, G, C
LAWS I, S
§ 770.16 (2006)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. 1999 R Y A, I,
§ 590.01(la) T
(2006)
Mississippi No statute
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. 2001 R Y Y A, I C
§§ 547.035, .037
(Supp. 2007)
Montana MONT. CODE 2003 R Y C
ANN.
§ 46-21-110
(2007)
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. 2001 L Y
§§ 29-4116 to
-4125 (2006 &
Supp. 2007)
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. 2003 R C
425
§§ 176.091,
.0919 (2007)
New N.H. REV. STAT. 2004 C Y
Hampshire ANN.
§ 651-D:2
(2007)
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. 2002 R Y
§ 2A:84A-32a
(West Supp.
2007)
New Mexico N.M. STAT. 2003 R C, I
§ 31-1A-2
(Supp. 2007)
425. Capital cases only.
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aE j
PRO.. L.W
New York N.Y. CRIM. 1994 R G R
PROC. LAW
§ 440.30(1-a)
(McKinney
2005)
North N.C. GEN. STAT. 2001 R
Carolina ANN.
§§ 15A-269,
-270 (2007)
North N.D. CENT. 2005 R Y
Dakota CODE
§ 29-32.1-15
(2006)
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE 2003 R Y Y C, I C
ANN.
§§ 2953.21, .23,
.71-83
(LexisNexis
Supp. 2007)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. 2002 R Y C,
ANN. tit. 22, S426
§§ 1371-1372
(West Supp.
2008)
Oregon 2005 Or. Laws 2001 R Y C, I,
2205; 2003 Or. S
Laws 1128;
2001 Or. Laws
1817
Pennsylvania 42 PA. CONS. 2002 R Y Y A, I M
STAT. ANN.
§ 9543.1
(West 2007)
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAws 2002 R Y
§§ 10-9.1-10 to
-12 (Supp.
2007)
South No statute
Carolina
426. Statute expired in 2005.
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§§ 40-3-301 t
ANN.2arts.
17.488 6t01
EC 01 Eo .8 1 a)
South No statute
Dakota
Tennessee TENN. CODE 2001 R C
ANN.
§§ 40-30-301 to
-313 (2006 &
Supp. 2007)
Texas TEX. CODE 2001 M I R
CRIM. PROC.
ANN. arts.
17.48, 64.01-
.05 (Vernon
2006 & Supp.
2007)
Utah UTAH CODE 2001 R Y C C
ANN.
§§ 78-35a-301
to 304 (2002 &
Supp. 2007)
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. 2007 R C
tit. 13, § 5561
(Supp. 2007)
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. 2001 C Y Y A, C C
§§ 19.2-327.1 to
-327.6 (Supp.
2007)
Washington WASH. REV. 2000 R Y Y C
CODE
§ 10.73.170
(2006)
West W.VA. CODE 2004 R Y C
Virginia ANN.
§ 15-2B-14
(Lexisexis
Supp. 2007)
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. 2001 R
§ 974.07
(2005-2006)
Wyoming WYO. STAT. 2008 L C
ANN.
§ 7-12-303
(effective
July 1, 2008)
